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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1- Introduction 
 
In this contemporary business world, putting the interest of developing countries 
(including Sub-Saharan Africa) at the forefront, agriculture is a topical issue for 
international trade negotiations at the GATT/WTO. According to an agricultural 
investment outlook, interregional differences in capital stocks per worker are likely to 
become more pronounced. While capital stock per worker doubled in East and South 
Asia, the Near East and North Africa regions, and tripled in Latin America, it was 
stagnating in Sub-Saharan Africa due to lack of interest in agricultural investment.1 This 
huge difference is solely as a result of hours of output per worker and the different 
development strategies pursued by the various regions in the agricultural sector.2 
Therefore, despite its comparative advantage in agriculture, Sub-Saharan Africa needs 
to put in more hours of output per worker as well as invest heavily in the agricultural 
sector. It is worth noting that Brazil‘s success from being a net-food importer to a net-
food exporter is accounted for by its mass investment, most especially in the area of 
agricultural Research and Development (R&D).3 With increased production and 
productivity in R&D, it led to gains from large scale farming via large agricultural 
enterprises.4 
 According to the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), the volume of world agricultural 
exports over the recent decades has increased substantially. However, its rate of 
                                                             
1
 An agricultural worker in Latin America was estimated to have about 28 times the capital available 
compared to a colleague in Sub-Saharan Africa. See, Schmidhuber, J.  Bruinsma, J. &Boedeker, G. 
(2009) ‗Capital Requirements for Agricultural Countries to 2050‘ Paper presented at the FAO Expert 
Meeting on ‗How to Feed the World in 2050‘, 24-26 June 2009, Rome. 15. Available: 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/esa/Global_persepctives/Long_term_papers/Capital-requirements-
agriculture.pdf [5
th
 March 2011]. 
2
 See, FAO, (13
th
 Oct. 2009) ‗How to Feed the World in 2050‘ High- level Expert Forum. Paper presented 
in Rome. 15. 
Available:http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/Issues_papers/HLEF2050_Investment.pdf 
[5
th
 March 2011]. 
3
 It is accompanied with expansion and incorporating of new agricultural lands as well as increase of 
agricultural inputs such as Tractors. 
4
 For details on Brazil‘s production strategy see, Neves, do A. A.W. &Peduto, A. (2010), ‗Food Security: 
the Brazilian Case: Series on Trade and Food Security-Policy Report‘ International Institute for 
Sustainable Development. 
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growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is very slow resulting in a steady decline of its share in 
world merchandise trade (at an annual rate of roughly 7.5%, estimated to be fairly 
stable at a current rate of 2.5%).5 During the period of 1965-1980, the average rate of 
agricultural growth (1.8% per annum) in Sub-Saharan Africa accompanied with high 
population growth rate of 2.7% resulted in a decline in per capita food production.6 Thus 
between 1980-82, a rapid increase in population growth rates (3.1%) concurrent to the 
slow growth rate in agriculture led to a rapid increase of food imports and high demand 
for food aid.7 According to a report by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the 
lack of agricultural investment over decades has led to continuing low productivity and 
stagnant production in many regions. Such deficiency has been identified as an 
important underlying cause of the recent food crisis and the many difficulties 
encountered by developing countries (especially Sub-Saharan Africa) in the Multilateral 
Trading System (MTS).8 To better understand the case of Sub-Saharan Africa regards 
agricultural trade under the MTS, an introduction to the issues that led to the Agreement 
on Agriculture (AoA) would be of utmost necessity. 
At the beginning of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), export 
competition in agriculture was given special treatment.9 For instance, while export 
subsidies were prohibited for non-agricultural products, they were allowed for 
agricultural products as long as the country using them did not gain more than an 
equitable share of the market.10 However, this was a loophole in the GATT (1947)11 
                                                             
5
 Agricultural Outlook, (2002) ‗The African Growth and Opportunity Act: How Much 
Opportunity?‘Available:http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/agoutlook/aug2002/ao293f.pdf [29
th
 
December 2010]. 
6
 Reasons being that population growth is at a geometric progression while agricultural growth is at a 
mathematical progression producing many mouths to feed but little food is available. 
7
Cleaver, K.M. (1993) ‗A strategy to develop agriculture in Sub-Saharan African and a focus for the World 
Bank‘, World Bank Technical PaperVols.23: No.203. Washington, D.C. World Bank. 23. 
8
 FAO Available: http://www.fao.org/es/ESC/en/index.html [29th December 2010]. 
9
Martin, W. & Winters, L.A. (1995) The Uruguay Round and the developing economies World Bank 
Publications, Parts 63: No. 307. 2. See also, Article XI of the GATT 1947. Though it prohibited 
quantitative restriction on industrial products, nevertheless, there was an exception in the agricultural 
sector. See also; Hillman, J.S. (1992), ‗Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: A United States 
Perspective‘,Tulsa LJ, vol. 28, 761. Available: 
http://heinonline.org./HOL/page?handle=hein.journal/tlj28&dv=37&g_1&collection=journal#773 
[30
th
September 2010].   
10
 See GATT Article XVI: 3 1947. 
11
Mosoti, V. &Gobena, A. (2007), International trade rules and the agriculture sector: selected 
implementation issues, Food & Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, Legislative Study 98; Rome, 
Italy. 34-35. 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
since export subsidies (which are trade distorting per se)12 could not be controlled 
effectively. This practice contributed in lowering world market prices, thereby hindering 
producers in exporting Sub-Saharan African countries, mostly because they lacked 
government support in terms of agricultural subsidies. In order to remedy this 
deficiency, the need for an Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was initiated as an annex to 
the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO).13 It began 
during the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (1986).  
Although agriculture was treated differently in the early stage of the original GATT 
(1947), it was not exempted from its Agenda.14 However, it was very difficult for the 
signatories to bring agriculture under the international trade discipline of the GATT. It is 
worth noting that most member states duly excluded the trade related issues of the 
agricultural sector from the MTS. The agricultural sector was therefore regarded as sui 
generis from other sectors in the economy and was therefore treated different. 
According to Melaku Desta: 
[... w]hen governments got together to negotiate for multilateral liberalization 
of international trade, agricultural products were considered a special case 
be fitting the status of an exception rather than the rule. This was reflected in 
the content of the first drafts as well as the final versions of both the Havana 
Charter as well as the General Agreement. Two particularly important trade 
restrictive and protective measures generally outlawed by the General 
Agreement were explicitly, albeit conditionally, permitted for agricultural 
products. They concern the use of quantitative restriction and export 
subsidies – the two traditional weapons used by governments to protect 
domestic producers from foreign competition in the domestic market and to 
artificially enhance the competitive advantage of their producers in foreign 
markets, respectively. What is more, even in areas where no such express 
                                                             
12
 Most subsidies are potentially those that would be prohibited and are identified as Actionable 
Subsidies. 
13
 See also, Paragraph two of the Preamble of the AoA. It states that the long term objective of WTO 
Members is ‗… to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system…‘ Therefore one of the 
cornerstones of the on-going negotiation is to bring this objective closer to reality. 
14
 See also Josling, T.E.;Tangermann, S. & Warley, T.K. (1996) ‗Agriculture in the GATT‘ St. Martin's 
Press, New York, USA. 11. 
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exceptions were provided, countries often ignored the rules more in the area 
of agriculture than elsewhere.15 
Most important amongst the reasons to protect the agricultural sector was the interest of 
national food security.16 Thus, as the manufacturing economy was expanding, leading 
to a relative decline in agriculture, political and social pressures emanated from 
industrialised countries, such as the US.17 This resulted to the use of quantitative 
restrictions in order to protect the agricultural sector from all the rigours of the 
international markets. Later, these restrictions were broadened through the use of a 
variety of quotas, variable levies, voluntary export restrictions, and minimum import 
rules. Also, other protective measures to restrict import were employed by the various 
countries in the world.18 
Before the Uruguay Round negotiation, there had been a series of negotiations on 
certain individual agricultural commodities under the GATT (1947). For instance, the 
Dillon Round (negotiations on tariff cuts to very low levels in respect of soya beans, 
cotton, vegetables and canned fruits) and the Kennedy Round (negotiations on the 
International Wheat Agreement and the International Meat Agreement).19 
The reasons for bringing agriculture under the MTS in the GATT framework were as 
follows: First, it was intended to regulate and encourage the idea of comparative 
advantage20 in agricultural production, whereby countries could specialise in areas in 
which they were best in production at lower costs with greater efficiency. Second, 
member states intended to ensure price stability in the world market for agricultural 
                                                             
15
Desta, M. G. (2002) The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture, The Hague, Kluwer Law International. 6. 
16
Martin, W. & Winters, L.A. (1995), 2. 
17
 Hillman, J.S. (1992), 762.  
18
Martin, W. & Winters, L.A. (1995), 2. 
19
 FAO, Available: http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/w7814e/W7814E04.htm: [19
th
 September, 2010]. 
20
 The theory of comparative cost advantage is an idea developed by an economist, David Ricardo, in 
1817.The theory states that in order for a country to compete in a global market it need not possess an 
absolute advantage as postulated by Adam Smith; rather, the country needs to concentrate and produce 
just what it is best at and in respect of which it has a higher level of efficiency with lesser cost incurred. 
The rationale of this theory is to encourage international trade. For instance, countries should export what 
they produce with greater efficiency, and in turn import what they cannot produce at a lesser cost 
compared to other countries. Thus, they should produce more, then export to other countries, and import 
what other countries produce with a comparative cost advantage. For further reading, see also 
Frederking, J. (2009) Comparative Cost Advantage and Factor Endowment: are these theories still 
relevant? Druck & Bindung (eds) Books on Demand Germany GmbH, Norderstedt Germany, 3. 
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commodities. Third, they intended to prevent the adoption of the concept of ‗agricultural 
protectionism‘ which had adverse effects on producers in developing countries.21 For 
instance, price disincentives jeopardised the chances of developing countries who due 
to lack of government support (subsidies) were competing with their developed 
counterparts in agricultural trade.22 It is worth noting that, policy makers of most Sub-
Saharan African countries do not care much about investing in agriculture especially 
with Research and Development (R&D). However, this is where Brazil‘s success story 
lies. Thus Kydd and Dorward described such agricultural investment deficiency by Sub-
Saharan Africa as an ‗agricultural investment dilemma‘.23 Therefore, despite the 
importance of agriculture, policy makers (governments) are reluctant to design and tailor 
specific agricultural investment programmes. It could be due to the lack of political 
willingness as regards the fact that priority is given to other political issues/agenda other 
than agriculture. 
After numerous trade tensions in previous GATT negotiation rounds,24 the Uruguay 
Round was launched in 1986 at Punta Del Este. Agricultural trade negotiations were 
also at the forefront with the intention to scrutinise issues on border controls and export 
subsidies (also to control the broad range of domestic policies on subsidies) which 
could result in trade distortions. The major actors of this negotiation were the USA, the 
European Community (EC) and the Cairns Group.25The EC and Japan26 were 
interested in protecting their farmers from international agricultural competition. The US 
demanded for liberalisation of trade in agriculture on a ‗zero-zero‘ basis. On the other 
hand, Sub-Saharan African countries were mainly focused and demanded for special 
                                                             
21
 According to the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the agricultural policies of industrialised 
countries in the past, before the agricultural negotiations in the original GATT, restricted access to world 
agricultural markets for low cost producers including developing exporting countries. See further readings: 
FAO, (1988), 2-3. 
22
Hillman, J.S. (1992),762. 
23
Kydd, J. &Dorward, A. (2001) ‗The Washington consensus on poor country agriculture: analysis, 
prescription and institutional gaps‘, Development Policy Review, vol. 19, No. 4. 4. 
24
 Before the Uruguay Round of 1986-1990, they had been seven other previous GATT rounds since 
World War II: Geneva (1947), Annecy (1949), Dillon (1960-61), Kennedy (1964-67), Tokyo (1974-79), 
before the Uruguay (1986-90) & the on-going round, Doha (1994- till date). 
25
 The Cairn Group consists of 19 WTO Members, today composed of: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. 
26
 Though Japan was in support of a reduction in export subsidies as a net importer of agricultural 
commodities, it wanted protection of its rice sector on the basis that it was not solely related to agriculture 
but played a unique role in the diet, culture and environment of the country. 
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treatment (Special and Differential Treatment-SDT) in order to meet up with their WTO 
commitments. They highlighted the importance of agriculture to their economy and 
requested for lesser obligations under the GATT/WTO especially on the magnitude of 
cuts on agricultural subsidies and longer time period to fully implement any policy 
changes.27 
During the Uruguay Round, the obligation to grant developing countries SDT was 
enshrined in the Preamble of the AoA.28 Developed countries were called regarding the 
particular needs and concerns of their developing counterparts in agricultural products 
and trade.29 Though it represented a strict application of the principle of non-reciprocity 
of commitments,30 the provisions were not reflected in the schedules of concessions. 
However, they were instituted in a very flexible form undertaken by developing countries 
with provisions of longer transition periods of up to ten years, whereas developed 
countries had just a maximum of six years.31 
After the Uruguay Round, a Fourth Ministerial Declaration of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) was launched in Doha (November 2001) called the Doha 
Development Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. There, the member 
governments re-affirmed a comprehensive negotiation on agriculture, on substantial 
improvement in market access, reductions of all forms of export subsidies (with a view 
to phasing them out) and substantial reductions in trade distorting domestic supports. 
Further, they agreed on SDT32 for developing countries as an integral part of all 
                                                             
27
 FAO, Available: http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/w7814e/W7814E04.htm [19th September 2010]. 
28
 Paragraph 6 of the preamble of the AoA stipulates that ‗… commitments under the reform programme 
should be made in an equitable way among all Members, having regard to non-trade concerns, including 
food security and the need to protect the environment; having regard to the agreement that special and 
differential treatment for developing countries is an integral element of the negotiations, and taking into 
account the possible negative effects of the implementation of the reform on least-developed and net 
food-importing developing countries…‘ further its enshrined in its  Articles 6(2), (4)(b), 9(4), 15, 20,all of 
the AoA. s 
29
Such needs and concerns included market access and technical assistance. 
30
 For instance, developed countries were to offer certain trade benefits to developing countries, and were 
not to expect any favour in return from their developing counterparts. 
31
Anderson, K. & Martin, W. (2005) ‗Agriculture Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda: 
Agricultural Negotiations and Special and Differential Treatment‘The World Economy, vol. 28, No.9, 1315. 
32
 The integration of SDT as part and parcel of the WTO‘s Agreement is cemented under the Doha 
Development Agenda by virtue of   paragraph 13 on Agriculture which states that SDT ‗...shall be an 
integral part of all elements of the negotiations on agriculture and shall be embodied in the schedules of 
concessions and commitments and as appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated…‘ Further 
paragraph 44 of the Declaration states that ‗…all SDT provisions shall be reviewed with the view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational…‘  
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elements of the negotiations on agriculture, and with the view that non-trade concerns 
would be taken into account in the negotiations as provided in the AoA.33 Relying on 
this, most Sub-Saharan African countries have become passive participants under the 
MTS. Rather than seeking alternative strategies to strengthen their domestic policies, 
they spend much time requesting for an extension of SDT provisions as a reliable 
strategy to compete with their developed counterparts in agricultural trade. Thus Sub-
Saharan Africa needs to make use of its comparative advantage by strengthening its 
domestic policies and to an extent liberalise its agricultural economy in order to benefit 
as Brazil during its Agrarian reform (1950 to 1980).34 Due to trade liberalisation, Brazil in 
the 1990s realised more gains unlike the period (Protectionism) it practiced the Import 
Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) strategy.35 
Under the GATT, special treatment36 was introduced in order to encourage and facilitate 
the easy integration of developing countries especially Sub-Saharan Africa, into the 
MTS on grounds that they were not economically viable and therefore needed technical 
assistance. However, after 50 years of the creation of the principle of SDT, most 
developing countries have not benefited much from it. Only developing countries like 
Brazil, Chile, China, India, and South Korea have been major beneficiaries due to an 
improvement in their economy.37 Thus majority of developing and least developed Sub-
Saharan countries still experience stagnation as well as a decline in their market share 
in world trade. According to International Trade Statistics compiled by the WTO 
Secretariat in recent years, the market share of most developing countries still lingers 
around 25%.38 Notably, the market share of about 48 developing countries has declined 
                                                             
33
Carlos, P. de Castillo, (Nov. 2005) ‗The Agriculture of the Americas in the Context of the Doha 
Development Agenda‘, Inter-American Institute of Agriculture for Cooperation on Agriculture, 5. 
34
 It is worthy to note that, due to Brazil‘s bitter experience on protectionism, liberalisation was adopted as 
a strategy to achieve its goals. For instance, most of the sectors became engaged in mass investment in 
agricultural research and productivity. 
35
 See Graham, D.H.; Gauthier, H. & de Barros, J.R.M. (1987) ‗Thirty years of agricultural growth in Brazil: 
crop performance, regional profile, and recent policy review‘, Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 1-34.  
36
Special treatment was the original word used for Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). 
37
Kessie, E. (2007) ‗The Legal Status of Special and Differential Treatment under the WTO Agreements‘, 
in Bermann, G.A & Mavroidis, P.C. (eds.) WTO Law and Developing Countries Cambridge University 
Press, New York, USA, 12. 
38
Kessie, E. in Bermann, G. &Mavroidis,P. C. (eds) (2007).See also WTO Secretariat, Participation of 
Developing Countries in World Trade: Recent Developments, and Trade of Least Developed Countries, 
WT/CoM.TD/W/65 of 15February 2000. 
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continuously by 0.5% on grounds that they are being marginalised in the MTS.39 
Though an attempt to extent SDT provisions seems good, Sub-Saharan African 
countries should cease from relying too much on it, but rather strengthen and improve 
their domestic policies to favour trade in the MTS just as Brazil. Therefore as far as 
International Trade is concerned, the success of Brazil as an emerging power in 
agricultural growth remains a model for Sub-Saharan Africa to reckon with. 
Due to the evolving debate on agriculture in the Doha round by member states, the 
results of the AoA have not been as positive as members expected. This is due to a 
failure by member states to agree on issues regarding the AoA most especially as 
everyone tries to protect their own interest. For instance, members have not been able 
to decide on a precise and well stated formula regarding tariff cuts and subsidies. 
Furthermore, there exists an unfolding debate regarding improved market access by 
developed countries to benefit their developing counterparts on a non-reciprocity basis. 
The fact is clear: though Africa needs SDT and even more, it is neither an adequate 
solution to the problem nor an end in itself. Thus considering the economic weakness of 
developing countries, their needs and concern for development (market access) was 
placed at the forefront during the launch of the Doha Development Agenda as follows: 
We seek to place developing countries‘ needs and interests at the heart of 
the work Programme adopted in this Declaration, … We shall continue to 
make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and 
especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth of 
world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. In 
this context, enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well-targeted, 
sustainably financed technical assistance and capacity-building programmes 
have important roles to play.40 
It is worth noting that, the Cancun Ministerial Meeting in 2003 ended prematurely41 
because of a lack of progress on issues concerning agriculture. The agricultural issues 
                                                             
39
Kessie, E. in Bermann, G. & Mavroidis, P. C. (eds) (2007), 12. 
40
 WTO, Available: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm [31st October 2010]. 
41
 Most of the ministers in the negotiation room at Cancun did not agree on any agenda and the meeting 
ended abruptly as they left the negotiation room before other agenda issues were seriously discussed 
because there was a dispute on the AoA over agricultural subsidies. See also ‗Global Trade Negotiations: 
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tendered for negotiations were concerned with market access, domestic support and 
export subsidies. Some member states found them either too ambitious or not ambitious 
enough to be decided upon.42 Thus they could not arrive at a consensus on a particular 
legal framework regarding the issues tabled for discussion.43 Also, at the Sixth 
Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong (December 2005), no great advancements were 
made regarding the issues on market access, export subsidies and domestic support 
measures.44Notwithstanding the numerous tensions, to an extent member states were 
able to agree on a dead-line (2013) to terminate export subsidies.45 
1.2- Statement of the Problem 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa has abundant arable land and a large labour force which could be 
transformed into increased agricultural production to meet its trade and food needs. 
However, it has not been able to use this opportunity fully in order to compete with other 
member states under the MTS. Thus Sub-Saharan Africa lacks consistent agricultural 
policies such as investing in Research and Development (R&D) which can boost its 
economy. Rather, Sub-Saharan Africa relies on an extension of SDT provisions as a 
better strategy to integrate itself into the MTS. Although agriculture accounts for about 
70% of the total labour force of Sub-Saharan Africa with over 25% consisting of its total 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 20% of its agribusinesses, very little priority is given 
to the sector by governments.46 It is worth noting that Sub-Saharan Africa together with 
other developing countries constitutes about two-thirds of the WTO membership.47 
These countries formed a coalition in the WTO regarding their special needs and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Cancun and Beyond‘, ‗an interview with Senior Vice President of International Policy and Economic 
Reform ,United States Chamber of Commerce, Willard A. Workman and CIPE, .Available: 
http://www.cipe.org/pdf/publications/fs/workman.pdf [7
th
 March,2011]. 
42
 WTO Director General Annual Report (2009), 12. 
43
WTO, Available: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_13sept_e.htm [31st 
October 2010]. 
44
 WTO, Available: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/min05_14dec_e.htm [31st 
October 2010]. 
45
McCalla, A.F. & Nash, J.D. (eds) (2007), Reforming Agricultural Trade for Developing Countries: Key 
issues for a pro-development outcome of the Doha Round negotiations. Vol.1.Washington, DC, USA, 
World Bank. XIV – XV. 
46
 UNECA, (2009) ‗Developing African Agriculture through Regional value Chains‘ Economic Report on 
Africa 2009.117. Abuja Summit on Food Security, Available: http://www.uneca.org/era2009 [7
th
 March, 
2011]. 
47
 The WTO Director General Annual Report (2009), 7. 
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concerns in agriculture under the MTS.48 Though agriculture is considered the 
backbone of Sub-Saharan Africa ( for its mass employment of labour force), the region 
still remains a net-food importer. Though with a comparative advantage in agriculture, 
there is continues demand for more SDT extensions in the MTS which is not an 
adequate solution. This practice has rather made Sub-Saharan Africa a passive actor in 
the MTS. Thus if Brazil, a developing country could benefit under the SDT why not Sub-
Saharan Africa who also has a comparative advantage in agriculture?49 
Notably, since the Uruguay Round, the too many demands by developing countries 
(Sub-Saharan Africa) for more SDT flexibilities and consideration (on market access 
and domestic support subsidies) has resulted in a competition and tension on trade in 
agriculture. Thus because of the use of trade distorting measures (subsidies), it created 
a disparity between the developed and developing countries. However, this practice is 
not acceptable in the MTS as both member groups seem to have placed too much 
emphasis on the use of SDT provisions rather than respecting the WTO Rule Based 
system which seeks to eliminate trade distorting measures.50 
Moreover, Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries argued that the AoA 
represents an unbalanced and skewed set of obligations, and that the WTO needs to 
make necessary changes to its rules to allow them implement specific policies which 
addresses the problem of agriculture in terms of food security and rural development.51 
                                                             
48
 WTO ACP countries whose preferences with the EU are on Agriculture are: WTO members 
(58):Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Côte 
d‘Ivoire, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. WTO 
observers (10):Bahamas, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Samoa, Sao Tomé and 
Principe, Seychelles, Sudan, Vanuatu; and  those who are not  WTO members or observers (11):Cook 
Islands, Eritrea, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Niue, Palau, Somalia, 
Timor-Leste, Tuvalu. Available: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr358_e.htm [7th December 
2010]. 
49
Kessie, E. in Bermann, G. &Mavroidis, P. C. (eds) (2007), 12.  
50
Hoda, A. &Galati, A. (2003) ‗Special and differential treatment in agricultural negotiations‘,  Indian 
Council for Research on International Economic Relations, Working Paper No.100, 12-16. 
51
Matthews, A. (2005) ‗Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO Agricultural negotiations‘, Institute 
for International Integration Studies Discussion paper No. 61. 3. 
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These issues were tabled for negotiation in the AoA identified as the ‗Development Box‘ 
for purposes of development concerns.52 
1.3-Research Questions 
- What reasons prevent Sub-Saharan Africa from benefiting from SDT provisions 
despite its comparative advantage in agriculture? 
- What are the reasons behind Brazil‘s success in agriculture that could act as 
lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa? 
- What is South Africa‘s position in agricultural growth as a leading Sub-Saharan 
country compared to Brazil in Latin America? 
- What robust policy actions could Sub-Saharan Africa put in place to stimulate its 
agricultural sector? 
1.4-Research Objectives 
 
This research seeks to examine and explore the constraints faced by Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the agricultural sector under the MTS. It also seeks to make recommendations 
which Sub-Saharan Africa might adopt in order to overcome such constraints under 
MTS. They include: reforming and tailoring domestic policies for sustainable economic 
growth; increased competitiveness for products in the domestic, regional and 
international markets as well as enhance productivity; and promote food security. This 
research argues that the demand for an extension of SDT provisions by Sub-Saharan 
Africa is not sufficient per se. Furthermore, it calls for Sub-Saharan African to improve 
on its domestic policies, develop alternative strategies in order to improve the 
agricultural sector. Never the less, this research will also examine Brazil‘s experience 
and strategies in the agricultural sector and to draw lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa. For 
a better understanding of the readings, first it will lay down the principle of the AoA as 
well as an overview of SDT.53 In addition, it will examine Brazil‘s strategic and 
agricultural policies, for Sub-Saharan Africa to draw lessons that suits its agricultural 
context. Moreover, it will examine the position of South Africa in agriculture under the 
                                                             
52
 See also WTO Available: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd28_ph2devt.etc_e.htm [1st October 2010]. 
53
The right term is ‗Differential and More Favourable Treatment‘ (SDT). This has been a principle of the 
GATT since the 1960s.See also Gibbs, M. (1998), 1. 
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MTS. Reason being that, South Africa stands as a leading country in Sub-Saharan 
Africa just as Brazil in Latin America. It is worth noting that under the Doha Declaration, 
not all SDT provisions at the WTO Agreements are mandatory.54 This imprecision was 
debated by both the developed and developing countries regarding the status of all SDT 
provisions.55 This resulted in slowing the negotiations at the Doha round.56 Though this 
research will not examine in detail the contentious issues of the concept of SDT, it will to 
an extent examine the various classes of SDT provisions that apply in agriculture. It will 
also examine the three pillars of the AoA. 
The various issues to be examined in this research are as follows: 
a) A brief historical rundown of GATT to WTO and an overview of the concept of 
SDT and its various provisions under the AoA; 
b) An overview of the AoA and the three pillars of agriculture: Market access, export 
competition and domestic support measures; 
c) A review and analysis of Brazil‘s success story in the agricultural sector; 
d) Constraints faced by Sub-Saharan Africa in the MTS in agricultural investment, 
and the position of South Africa; and 
e) Alternatives/solutions, such as, regional integration, improvement on trade 
policies and government intervention to lock in/implement sound domestic 
policies and capacity building. 
 
                                                             
54
Kessie, E. (2000), 975. 
55
 For instance developing countries argued that all SDT provisions are indivisible and should be seen as 
a package that strikes a careful balance between the rights of developing countries and those of the 
developed countries. Further that if the provisions were intended to create justifiable rights, then they 
would not have inserted them in the WTO Agreements, moreover that nothing prevented the drafters from 
stating clearly that SDT provisions are merely ―best-endeavour‖ clauses that were not capable of being 
enforced. Lastly, that as some developed countries had agreed to sign the Marrakesh Agreement they 
believed that the developed countries would honour the commitments they assumed would be in their 
favour. On the other hand, developed countries took a contrary view as they argued that SDT provisions 
should be seen for what they are: voluntary commitments assumed by developed countries in favour of 
developing countries; also that there is nothing in the language of SDT provisions which expresses the 
intention to create justifiable rights; and that if the position of developing countries was to prevail, then it 
would harden their negotiation positions in the Doha Development Agenda(DDA) and make them insist 
on full reciprocity. See also, Kessie, E. in Bermann, G. & Mavroidis, P. C. (eds) (2007),13-14. 
56
 The fact that the 2006 meeting on the Doha Negotiation failed since members could not decide, it is 
evidenced that the Doha Negotiations have been dragged by Member states because of their wide and 
varied interests which they sought to protect under the ongoing negotiations. 
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1.5-Significance of the Research 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa has been advocating for more SDT provisions in the on-going Doha 
Development Agenda due to its weak economic status, and has delayed the results of 
this round. According to Thomas C. Beierle,57 agricultural trade liberalisation would raise 
world prices by 12% and would result in welfare gains for developing countries of up to 
$21 billion annually provided only if investment and productivity gains are factored in.58 
Therefore, policies complementing agricultural trade liberalisation will reduce food 
prices. Also, as contended by Ingco M.D. & Nash J.D, agricultural trade liberalisation 
creates room for a trading system which promotes development.59 Thus Sub-Saharan 
Africa needs to implement strategies complementing to agricultural trade liberalisation.60 
Though special and differential concerns are considered by most as an issue for Sub-
Saharan Africa to bargain for in the ongoing agricultural trade negotiations, this 
research takes a different view recommending alternative and specific policies that 
could be adopted by Sub-Saharan Africa which suits its agricultural context.61 
In a nut shell, this research will give a better understanding regarding the principle of 
SDT and the AoA as well as the various SDT provisions that applies to market access, 
export subsidies and domestic support measures. Most important, this research will 
enable and facilitate the decision-making process by Policy makers (governments) to 
favour growth and productivity despite the political realities and specific constraints 
faced by Sub-Saharan Africa in the agricultural sector. This research will also assist and 
guide stakeholders (interested in agricultural investment) on how to lobby Sub-Saharan 
African governments to their favour. Finally, it will make Sub-Saharan African countries 
to refrain from spending fabulous sums of money in advocating for SDT enlargement.  
 
                                                             
57
 This is found in an analysis conducted by the Economic Research Service of the USDA. 
58
 Thomas, C. B. (March 2002) ‗From Uruguay to Doha: Agricultural Trade Negotiations at the World 
Trade Organization.‘ Discussion Paper 2–13. 
59
 For details see, Ingco, M.D. & Nash, J.D. (eds) (2004) ‗Agriculture and the WTO: creating a trading 
System for Development.‘ Washington, DC.  
60
 A lesson should be drawn from the American Policy of Isolationism/Protectionism practised during the 
1930s which suffered from economic crises before the outbreak of World War II as a result of border 
protection from competitors as a strategy to encourage home trade industries. 
61
 See also, Mulleta, F.F. (2009) ‗Special and Differential Treatment for Trade in Agriculture: Does it 
answer the Quest for Development in African Countries?‘ Unpublished LL.M Thesis, University of the 
Western Cape. 
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Considering Sub-Saharan Africa‘s comparative advantage in agriculture and mindful of 
the fact that it possesses almost similar features as Brazil, if it pursues proper 
agricultural policies which suits its specific agricultural context, it will benefit in 
agricultural trade at the multilateral level. 
 
1.6- Scope of the Research 
 
This research paper will focus on trade and agricultural investment strategies in the 
MTS with lessons drawn from Brazil for Sub-Saharan Africa. It will lay down an overview 
of the AoA and SDT provisions. Furthermore, it will discuss briefly the historical 
evolution of the GATT to WTO considering the fact that both SDT and the AoA got their 
roots from these organs. Moreover, this research will be limited to the Brazilian 
experience in agriculture from the 1950s. In addition, it will also limit itself to the 
constraints faced by Sub-Saharan Africa in the agricultural sector. Later it will be 
narrowed down to examine the position of South Africa in agricultural trade under the 
MTS. This is because South Africa62 has almost similar features as Brazil and notably, it 
is a leading Sub-Saharan African country in terms of economic growth comparable to 
Brazil in Latin America. Therefore, it stands out clear that South Africa can stimulate the 
growth trend in the Sub-Saharan African region if it draws appropriate lessons from 
Brazil in the multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. Finally, this research will 
recommend possible solutions that can serve as a way forward for Sub-Saharan Africa 
in agriculture. 
1.7-Methodology 
 
This research will make reference to primary and secondary sources, such as, working 
papers, GATT‘s legal text, the AoA, articles, World Bank reports; electronic sources, 
especially from the WTO, FAO, UNCTAD, and NEPAD websites, reports, textbooks, 
and other research materials. Further, a study will be made on Brazil‘s strategy in its 
agricultural sector, and its participation in the AoA. It will serve as an illuminating lesson 
for Sub-Saharan Africa.  The case of Brazil will be examined based on the fact that both 
continents are located at the Tropics. Both share almost similar geographical features 
with a large part of Brazil having similar climatic and soil conditions as in Sub-Saharan 
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 It is a developing country though its status in the WTO stands as being a developed country. However, 
the governments are in a negotiation process to retrieve their developing status back. 
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Africa, favouring agriculture. Secondly, Brazil and most Sub-Saharan African countries 
are members of the WTO and are entitled to benefit from SDT. Thirdly, Brazil has 
indulged in South-South cooperation as an emerging world economy and its position 
serves as a motivation to many Sub-Saharan African countries. This is the case with 
Brazil‘s efforts in joint research works on projects63 developed in an attempt to improve 
agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa in countries like Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Togo.64 
 
1.8- Chapter Overview 
 
This research paper is divided into five chapters as follows: 
Chapter one includes the research objective, a background study to the evolution of the 
AoA under the original GATT 1947to the present. It also includes discussion on the 
emergence of SDT under the AoA and a criticism of Sub-Saharan African countries 
passive altitude in the MTS. Furthermore, it also consists of a scope and the 
significance of the research. It also, defines the research questions and the 
methodologies applied.  Finally, it provides a general overview of the chapters outline. 
Chapter two consists of an overview of the concept of SDT and the legal framework. It 
also examines the raison d‘être (rationale) for the application of SDT and the various 
categories of the SDT provisions applicable to the AoA. In addition, it will examine the 
three pillars of the AoA: market access, domestic and export support subsidies. Then it 
is followed by a review of the ongoing negotiations. 
 
Chapter three will examine the Brazilian experience in the agricultural sector since 1950 
(three decades), past government policies in the post-world war period; policies 
complementing to agriculture and trade, and Brazil‘s involvement in multilateral and 
bilateral agreements relating to agriculture. 
 
                                                             
63
 It includes projects such as rehabilitation of pastures, natural resource management and the production 
of clean energy. 
64
World Bank, ‗Africa and Brazil Form Knowledge Partnership to Boost African Agriculture‘ Available: 
http://web.worldbank.org/l [4
th
 May 2011]. 
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Chapter four looks at the background introduction to agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and the constraints faced by agriculture. Furthermore, it will look at the South African 
position, its effort in the agricultural sector under the MTS and bilateral trade 
agreements 
 
Chapter five provides a conclusion and recommendations to the constraints faced by 
Sub-Saharan African countries in agricultural trade under the MTS. Most of these 
recommendations will be formulated from Brazil‘s experience as lessons drawn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW FROM THE GATT TO THE WTO, THE CONCEPT OF SPECIAL AND 
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT (SDT) AND THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 
(AoA) 
 
2.1- Evolution from the GATT to the WTO 
To better understand both the basic concepts of SDT and the AoA, a brief historical 
evolution of the GATT to the WTO is necessary in as much as both concepts originate 
from the GATT/WTO. 
 
Before the coming into force of the World Trade Organisation (WTO),65 there existed a 
de facto original GATT (1947).  It later came into force provisionally in 1948 (presently 
GATT 1994). The GATT 1947was an end product of the Havana Conference in Cuba, 
due to failure to establish an International Trade Organisation (ITO).During the post War 
reconstruction period, plans were made to construct an International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (presently the World 
Bank) and the ITO at a Conference in Havana.66 Despite successful negotiations at the 
Havana Conference (1948), the US Congress refused to ratify the Charter concluding 
the ITO.67 Nevertheless, 2368 member states out of which 11 were developing countries 
stood to sign the GATT 1947. It is worth noting that there was no formal recognition of 
such a group as developing countries. Moreover, the GATT did not give room for any 
provision covering their special needs.69 
 
 
 
                                                             
65
  The WTO has incorporated the GATT 1994. 
66
 These institutions were known as the Bretton Woods Institutions.  
67
Michalopoulos, C. (2000) ‗The role of special and differential treatment for developing countries in GATT 
and the World Trade Organization‘ Working Paper No. 2388, World Bank, 2, Available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=630760 [29
th
 November 2010]. See also, Jackson, 
J.H. (1969) World trade and the law of GATT: (a legal analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade). Bobbs-Merrill 49-53. 
68
 These countries were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma(Myanmar), Canada, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Chile, 
China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Syria, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.  
69
Michalopoulos, C. (2000), 2.  
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The fundamental reason for GATT was to setup an international institution to encourage 
and regulate trade through reciprocal and mutual arrangements, addressing the growing 
international trade tariff, as well as correcting the effects of the Post War era; thus 
raising members‘ standards of living, ensuring full employment, large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing full use of the world‘s 
resources in expanding production and exchange of goods.70 
 
Before the Uruguay round of negotiations, a series of GATT negotiation rounds existed 
(eight rounds of Multilateral Trade negotiations),71 and operated under specific 
frameworks and schedules.72 Most developing countries alluded to the Uruguay round 
amendment as an opportunity to control the ‗rogue elephant‘ (the U.S), and its arbitrary 
actions (by virtue of Article 301 of its Trade Act).73 In fact, the Uruguay Round at the 
Marrakesh Declaration (Morocco) marked a turning point to the GATT (1947). For 
instance, it expanded the scope of the GATT, created an annex establishing the WTO 
(under the Marrakesh Agreement dated April 15 1994, later came in force on January 1, 
1995) and brought about further economic liberalisation which continues to date. For the 
very first time and due to reforms of the Uruguay round, member states accepted the 
concept of Single Undertaking.74 This round also marks a clear departure from the 
traditional approach of SDT, and contributed to the enormous reductions of tariffs in 
industrial products. In addition, it created new trade negotiation fronts which address 
trade in agriculture, services and intellectual property.75 
 
 
 
                                                             
70
 GATT (1947) Legal Text, Paragraph 2 of the Preamble, 424. 
71
 The various rounds include: Geneva (1947), Annecy (1949), Torquay (1951), Geneva (1956), Dillon 
(1960-1961), Kennedy (1964-1967), Tokyo (1974-1979) ,Uruguay (1986-1990) and the on-going 
negotiation in Doha (1994- till present) .Available: http://www.wto.org/english[10
th
 March 2010]. 
72
Hoda, A. (2001) Tariff Negotiations and Renegotiations under the GATT and the WTO: Procedures and 
Practice, WTO, Cambridge University Press, UK. 25-26.  
73
Sen, S. (1994), ‗From GATT to WTO‘, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 29, No. 43. 2802-2804. 2802 
Available: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4401936[10
th
 March, 2011]. 
74
 Single undertaking requires that all WTO members must accept jointly all the agreements administered, 
except for the two plurilateral agreements (Agreements on Government Procurement and Trade in Civil 
Air Craft), though their membership remains optional. 
75
Fukasuku, K. (2000) ‗Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries: Does it help those 
who help themselves? Working Paper, No. 197, UNU/WIDER, 7. See also, Sunderland, P. (1993) 
‗Statement, in: GATT, News of the Uruguay Round‘, 2. 
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Comparatively, both the WTO and the GATT, maintain similar underlying principles: the 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and National Treatment (NT) principles of which member 
states of the WTO rely on a framework that restricts the discrimination amongst them. 
Notwithstanding, there exist some remarkable differences between the GATT and the 
WTO: 
 
First, the GATT covered only trade in goods and did not include trade in agricultural and 
textile products. Whereas, the WTO covers extensively trade in services, intellectual 
property rights, and all goods including agricultural and textile products.76 Furthermore, 
the WTO has extended its coverage on the sectors of investment, government 
procurement and trade facilitation.77 
 
Second, the WTO adopts the concept of Single Undertaking for members, as a strategy 
to implement legally binding obligations. In addition, it made provision for Plurilateral 
Agreements on certain sectors.78 Whereas decision making under the GATT, was more 
flexible and depended upon members bargaining position. Thus while under GATT, 
countries could give up certain commitments, with the WTO it was not possible once 
acceded as a member.79 
 
Third, the WTO has gained credibility and legality for its highly legalised dispute 
settlement system covered under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).80The 
DSU acts as a central pillar of the MTS and contributes to the stability of the global 
economy regards dispute settlement amongst members of the WTO. For instance, it 
expressly spells out with greater clarity, the rules on consultation and the binding of 
decisions such as the Negative Consensus.81 In addition, while the WTO has created a 
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 These agreements are incorporated in the 1994 GATT legal text as the Results of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations which established the WTO. 
77
 Among these Singapore Issues, but for trade facilitation, developing countries are a strong resistance 
to negotiate the two others.   
78
 Agreement on Government Procurement and Agreement on Trade in Civil Air Craft which still remains 
optional. 
79
 See alsoTussie, D. &Lengyel, F. M., ‗Developing Countries: Turning Participation into Influence‘ In 
Hoekman, B.M, et al (eds), (2002), 51.   
80
Mosoti, V. &Gobena, A. (2007), International trade rules and the agriculture sector: selected 
implementation issues, Food & Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN Legislative Study 98; Rome, 
Italy, 12. 
81
 It is principle relied upon by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) which states that, decisions of a 
dispute will be adopted unless all members oppose the findings. 
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standing Appellate Body which has been very active in solving disputes in the MTS, the 
GATThad just two provisions (Articles XXII and XXIII GATT 1947) regulating dispute 
settlement and it addressed just certain dispute settlement matters.82 
 
Fourth, while the GATT which started as a de facto organ was signed only by 23 
contracting states although later expanded to 99 members by 1979,the WTO has 153 
members, of which about two third is composed of developing countries. 
 
Fifth, as regards membership, while accession by countries to the GATT was more 
relaxed, accession by countries to the WTO is very complex as prospective members 
must undergo an accession period. For instance, it took China about 13 years to accede 
to the WTO while Russia has been under accession since June 1993. 
 
As mentioned earlier, in Chapter one, both the WTO and GATT are composed of a Rule 
Based system (the MFN and NT Principles).83 It is aimed at promoting fair and freer 
trade competition, the predictability of binding and transparency principles, and 
encouraging development and economic reforms. It is worth noting that, the WTO is 
sometimes described as a ‗free trade institution‘ (basing on its rules based system 
which is dedicated to open, fair and undistorted competition).84 It is therefore classified 
within three frameworks: Substantive obligations85, WTO Exceptions86 and the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Annex 2 of the GATT).87 
 
Conclusively, the historical evolution of GATT to WTO laid down an in depth analysis of 
both the concepts of SDT and the AoA which originated from the failure to establish an 
ITO. 
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2.2-The Principle of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) 
2.2.1-Origin of the Concept of SDT  
The genesis of the concept of SDT is wide and varied. The concept of SDT began since 
the inception of the original GATT (1948-1955).88 As mentioned earlier in chapter one, 
outof the 23 signatories of the GATT (1947), 11 were developing countries.89 Neither 
were these developing countries formally recognised nor were there any special 
provisions (exceptions) under the GATT Agreements that covered their rights and 
obligations. However, insubsequent trade negotiations, their interest were recognised 
and annexed in the GATT agreements.90 Thus special and diferential treatment was 
later initiated in order to address the trade interest of this group of developing country 
members.91 Thusthe SDT concept became prominent and was incorporated in 
subsequent trade negotiations as an exception to the two basic principles of the WTO 
Agreements.92 
 
By virtue of the MFN principle: ‗any benefit, favour, privilege, or immunity with respect to 
customs duties and charges granted by any contracting party to products originating or 
destined from any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to 
all like products originating from other WTO member countries‘.93 Whereas, the National 
Treatment principle stipulates: ‗no member state shall discriminate between imported 
products from member countries against domestic products of the home country‘.94 
Thus, it is upon these two basic principles that the platform of the WTO rules based 
system solely relies. As it is interpreted, it deals with equal treatment for all members 
and no discrimination irrespective of economic disparity. 
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In the 1950s, owing to the accession of a number of newly independent countries, the 
fundamental objective of the GATT‘s rules based system was challenged. Upon the 
basis of developing countries weak economies, they argued that it was unjust to 
compete on a level playing field with well-established industrialised countries under the 
MTS.95 Based on their argument and considering their trade needs, at the Marrakesh 
Agreement the idea of SDT was then annexed in the GATT/WTO. However, in the 
GATT, there is still no certain and precise legal definition of the concept of SDT. 
Whatever the case, multiple and varied definitions have been advanced regarding 
SDT‘s structure and the manner of its application under the MTS. According to Ceara, 
SDT is defined as ‗measures to compensate developing countries for the structural 
asymmetries existing between them and the developed countries‘.96 Alternatively, SDT 
can be defined as those special rights and privileges accorded to developing member 
countries of the GATT with due exclusion of developed countries.97 
 
The rights and privileges under SDT in its various forms are made available only to 
developing countries without extension to their developed counterparts. These 
privileges take into account the economic imbalance and developmental needs of both 
groups under the MTS. The application of such a concept of SDT has resulted to an 
unfolding debate pertaining to legal enforceability98 and criticism that there is no 
precise/standard criterion according to which GATT/WTO classifies developing 
countries as regards benefits in SDT preferences. It is evidenced that, designation by 
member states was and still, is by self-selection regardless of members‘ economic 
status. Thus the criterion remains a self-selection process. It seems therefore that, the 
WTO does not bother to set any standard criteria for determining economic status of its 
members.99 The aim of the preferences under SDT is to grant developing countries 
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leeway to access the markets of industrial countries and also to have a policy discretion 
that permits them to protect their own domestic markets.100 One thing is certain: there is 
still no official definition of what constitutes a ‗developing country‘.101 During the 1954-55 
GATT review session, three main provisions were adopted as agreed upon to address 
the needs of developing countries. Amongst them, two provisions (Article XVIII and 
Article XVIII (B)) permitted developing countries in their early stage of development to 
implement quantitative import restrictions (whenever deemed necessary),102 whereas, 
Article XVIII(C) was revised to allow the imposition of both tariffs and quantitative trade 
restrictions in order to support infant industries.103 Considering the imprecision in the 
definition, SDT is interpreted as follows: 
 
The term ‗special and differential treatment‘ (SDT) has a narrow meaning in 
the WTO. It describes preferential provisions that apply only to two groups of 
members: developing countries (DCs) and the least developed (LDCs).104 
 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter one, from the very beginning of the GATT,SDT was 
never intended as part of the GATT Agreements. Surprisingly, SDT was later integrated 
into GATT Agreements in an attempt to promote trade liberalisation, overcome the 
economic weaknesses of developing member countries in the MTS and the difficulties 
faced during the implementation of the GATT rules.105 The interest of SDT is expressed 
by the wordings of paragraph two of the Preamble of the WTO as follows; that, the 
parties to this agreement: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
although graduated from being called a Developing Country.  See also Pangestu, M. (2000) ‗Special and 
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Oyejide, T. A. (2002) ‗Special and Differential Treatment‘ In Hoekman, B. M. et al (eds), 504.   
101
Michalopoulos, C. (2000), 2. 
102
 They included a strategy for long term development for monetary reserves in times of Balance of 
payment problems. 
103
Michalopoulos, C. (2000), 4. 
104
 IISD, (2003) ‗Special and Differential Treatment‘, IISD Trade and Development Brief, No 2 of Series, 
International Institute for Sustainable Development prepared by IISD Swiss Agency of for Development 
and Cooperation (SADC); see also Oyejide, T. A., in Hoekman, B. et al (eds), (2002), 504.  
105
 See Kessie, E. (2007), (On the origin of SDT), 16. The arguments put forth by developing countries led 
to the redrafting of Article XVIII of the 1954-1955 GATT review session, inclusion of Article XVI: 4 on 
exemption on export subsidies, Article XXVIII bis on flexibility of tariff protection in GATT and the adoption 
of Part IV (it comprises Articles XXXVI, XXXVII & XXXVIII) which compelled developed countries to offer 
trade concessions to their developing counterparts thus increasing their trade opportunities. In this 
regard, a Committee on Trade and Development was mandated to monitor the application of this Part IV 
(all this was done effectively after the adoption of the Enabling Clause by contracting member states) 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
[R]ecognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure 
that developing countries and especially the least developed among them, 
secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the 
needs of their economic development…106 
 
Thus this expresses the concern of WTO members to take into account the special 
interests of developing and least developed countries. Therefore certain measures were 
to be implemented in order to easily accommodate these countries in the MTS.  
2.2.2-The Raison D’être of SDT under the Multilateral Trading System (MTS) 
  
The raison d‘être for integrating SDT provisions within the GATT Agreements relates to 
the arguments raised by developing countries.107 The reasons are many and cover a 
range of differing and dynamic views of developing countries needs and requirements of 
the international system.108 One of the main ideas for SDT rests on the economic 
disequilibrium in the MTS that exists between the developed and developing member 
countries, to the favour of the developed countries. The consequence of such economic 
disequilibrium raised the concern of developing country members at the WTO. Since 
SDT was made prominent during movements towards trade liberalisation, upon the 
accession of newly independent developing countries to the GATT in the 1950, they 
kept insisting for more SDT. Ardently, they argued and even opposed the single 
undertaking principle, but demanded for more and flexible trade preferences from their 
developed counterparts. The situation is expressed by Hudec R as follows: 
 
[I]n particular, developing countries have consistently denied the relevance to 
themselves of the twin GATT concepts of ‗equal treatment‘ and reciprocal 
trade liberalization. Arguing that ‗equal treatment of unequals is unfair‘, 
developing countries have demanded discrimination in their favour under the 
general rubric of ‗special and differential treatment‘ or, more recently, 
‗differential and more favourable treatment‘. Arguing that reliance on the 
market thwarts economic development, developing countries have insisted 
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on their need to introduce protection at home while receiving market access 
and preferential treatment abroad...109 
 
Thus, developing countries sought to achieve two preferences under the GATT. First, 
they intend to achieve the rights to Import-restriction Measures in order to protect their 
infant industries as against the imports of developed countries. Second, they sought to 
achieve the right to preferences that will enhance their access to developed country 
markets. However, other reasons for developing countries interest in SDT as follows: 
 
First, developing country members under the original GATT base their claim on the 
existence of economic disparity (differences). They argued that, considering the weak 
nature of their economic and financial status, they cannot compete effectively with 
developed countries on a level playing field.110 Therefore, on grounds that one size 
does not fit all and for reasons of economic disparity, developing countries requested for 
special treatment as a disadvantaged social group.111 Since, most developing countries 
saw the need for SDT as a better solution to integrate themselves in to the MTS, they 
kept advocating for more and more extension. They regard SDT as a solution to help 
prevent the situation, wherein a lion's share would keep going to the lions, while the 
poor lambs would themselves be swallowed up in the process.112 However, they need 
to prove to be tough in order to grab a lion‘s share. 
 
Second, in the 1950s, developing countries alleged that, SDT is a means to solve their 
problem of permanent Balance-of-Payment difficulties.113 However, owing to the views 
of Singer-Prebisch, if developing countries are given a preferential market access to 
developed countries‘ markets, it will boost the exports of their home domestic products. 
Thus, it will offset the effects of secular decline in their terms of trade as well as improve 
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their economic growth.114 However, this can be possible only if they are able to produce 
enough agricultural products. For instance, Sub-Saharan Africa (a developing country 
region) is unable to produce much in order to compete with developed countries. In this 
light, most developing countries look at trade liberalisation as a hindrance to their infant 
industries since their economy is reliant mostly on the colonial style of commodity 
exports. Thus they sought to use protective tariff and non-tariff barriers; export subsidies 
and control policies as a strategy to pursue and promote industrialisation and 
diversification.115 
 
Third, in an attempt to meet up with the standards in the MTS, developing countries 
faced many challenges as they factored in a lot of resources (such as accessing new 
markets and setting up of production standards). These difficulties arose due to lack of 
adequate trained workers, less capital and the availability of fewer subsidies. Thus 
intend they believe that SDT will help adjust their policies so that they can meet up with 
the commitments of the MTS.116 On this view, they turned to rely on SDT preferences 
such as market access to developed countries‘ markets and the provision of technical 
assistance as a way out under the MTS.117 It is worthy to note that a higher proportion 
of developing countries‘ economies is composed mostly of the primary sector. 
 
Last, because most developing countries have a fragile economy and mindful of the fact 
that it is costly in an attempt to implement the MTS rules, SDT was relied upon as a 
remedy. As such developing countries were to be given special treatment in order to 
easily facilitate their integration into the MTS.118 It is evidenced by the very poor nature 
of their background in trade. For instance, upon accession of newly independent 
developing countries to the GATT, the market share of most developing countries in 
world trade is very minimal. As mentioned earlier in chapter one, Sub-Saharan African 
countries market share in world agricultural trade is stagnating and has declined 
continuously. However, most developing countries attribute this decline to 
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marginalisation in the MTS and that they incur very heavy costs in implementing WTO 
rules which becomes cumbersome and onerous.119 
 
From a general perspective, the raison d‘être of SDT is the cornerstone for most 
developing countries bargaining position (in the ongoing GATT/WTO negotiations). 
Initially they sought to protect their domestic markets; later on, they requested for more 
preferences on access to developed country markets on a non-reciprocal basis. 
However, developing countries laid their claim for SDT on two main grounds: protecting 
their infant industries against their developed counterparts and seeking of preferences 
to access developed country markets. 
2.2.3-The Six Classes of SDT Provisions and their application to the AoA 
 
When the special needs and concerns of developing countries were recognised under 
the GATT, SDT was incorporated gradually under a series of negotiation Rounds 
ranging from 1947.120 The mode of SDT provisions are grouped into six various 
classes.121 Most of these provisions have given room for an unfolding debate as regards 
the extent to which they are legally enforceable.122 The six classes of SDT could also be 
identified under two categories: Positive Actions and Exemptions. First, Positive actions 
commits developed member countries of the WTO to provide preferential and differential 
treatments to their developing counterparts (especially to Least-developed and Net-Food 
Importing developing countries-NFIDCs). Second, with Exemptions, developing 
countries are given the right to undertake lesser and flexible commitments in the MTS 
unlike their developed counterparts.123 The six categories of SDT as well as the 
provisions applicable to the AoA are as follows:124 
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2.2.3.1- Provisions aimed at increasing trade opportunities for developing 
countries 
 
With regards to this class of GATT/WTO Agreements, the provisions are aimed at 
committing WTO members (especially the developed countries), to adopt and rely on 
measures to increase trade opportunities of their developing counterparts (especially 
the Least Developed countries).125 This category consists of fifteen provisions 
established under the various Agreements, and just one under the AoA. With this class, 
developed members are obliged to grant preferential market access to products of 
developing member countries. This is aimed at stimulating developing countries‘ exports 
industry and to enhance exports earnings dealing with the problem of balance-of-
payments (BOP). On this premise, developing countries are exempted from the MFN 
rule regarding trade with their developed counterparts. These benefits are possible 
under the Generalised System Preference, introduced under the Enabling Clause,126 
criticised for making developing countries become passive actors in the MTS.127 
Regarding the AoA; this category of SDT is enshrined in paragraph 5 of the preamble 
as follows: 
 
Having agreed that in implementing their commitments on market access, 
developed country Members would take fully into account the particular 
needs and conditions of developing country members by providing a greater 
improvement of opportunities and terms of access for agricultural products of 
particular interest to these Members, including the fullest liberalization of 
trade in tropical agricultural products as agreed at the Mid-Term Review, and 
for the growing of illicit narcotic crops;…128 
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This class of SDT provision is considered a positive action per se because it obliges the 
developed member countries to consider the trade needs of their developing 
counterparts (such as enhance market access), in order to encourage them to diversify 
their agricultural production in the multilateral trade thereby avoiding the sale of illegal 
products like narcotics. 
2.2.3.2- Provisions that require WTO members to safeguard the interests of 
developing countries 
 
This category of SDT contains 43 provisions under the various GATT Agreements. As 
regards its role, developed countries are obliged to take cognizance of the special and 
differential situation of their developing counterparts. They are to protect and exempt 
developing countries from all mishaps in any attempt to impose measures on 
constructive safeguard remedies129 and/or anti-dumping duties,130 which they foresee 
are likely to affect the trade interests of developing countries.131 However, none of these 
SDT provisions are found under the AoA. As noted, they are classified under positive 
actions. 
2.2.3.3- The Flexibility of commitments, actions and the use of policy instruments 
 
 
Akin to this SDT category, WTO members aim at motivating and encouraging the 
participation of developing countries with the introduction of flexibilities and trade 
concessions. Developed members of the WTO therefore decided to respect the 
principle of Non-reciprocity with their developing counterparts,132 removing certain 
commitments on tariffs in order to stimulate developing countries participation in 
international trade. As it applies, developing countries were given the rights to assume 
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fewer and lesser obligations under the various Agreements.133 But with the AoA,134 
developing countries are given the privilege of flexibility under government support 
measures;135 furthermore, to assume fewer and lesser obligations such as reducing 
tariffs by 24% (on average) over 10 years (Developed Countries by 36% over six years) 
while on each tariff line, they are to reduce by at least 10% (Developed Countries by 
15%).136 Regarding trade distorting domestic measures, developing countries are 
expected to reduce such measures by 13.5% over 10 years (Developed Countries by 
20% over 10 years). As regards export subsidies, developing countries are to reduce 
their value and volume by 24% and 14%, respectively, over 10 years (Developed 
Countries by 21% and 36%, respectively, over six years); whereas Least Developing 
countries were exempted from any reduction commitments.137 It is worth noting that the 
provisions of this category (of the AoA) are not positive actions for they do not obliged 
members to take in to account the concerns of developing countries. 
 
2.2.3.4-Provisions of transitional time-periods of member countries under the 
WTO 
 
This provision gives developing country members the freedom of longer time periods to 
comply with their fewer and lesser obligations under the MTS, unlike their developed 
counterparts. It is worth noting that almost all WTO Agreements138 makes provision for 
longer transitional time periods for developing countries. However, that is not the case 
with Anti-Dumping and Pre-Shipment Inspection Agreements as both takes a different 
approach regarding time periods and flexibility. Regarding the desirable form of 
compliance in both, developing countries have to decide either on whole or just certain 
provisions of the said Agreements.139 As stated in the AoA, developing countries were 
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given a ten year flexibility term for the implementation of their reduction commitments 
(Developed Countries were given six years), whereas Least Developed countries were 
not required to undertake any reduction commitments.140 However, this transition period 
is no longer valid for developing country members since the time allocated has expired. 
2.2.3.5-Provisions relating to technical assistance for Developing Country 
members 
 
In this category of positive actions, the WTO Secretariat and developed country 
members are obliged in most of the WTO Agreements.141 They are committed to 
provide technical assistance to their Developing and Least Developed counterparts in 
order to enable them to participate actively and effectively in the MTS. Technical 
assistance is expressed in various forms: technology processing, research and 
infrastructural development, training, and the seeking of technical expertise in the 
various domain of trade. In fact, this is one of the primary bases upon which developing 
countries rest their interest regarding SDT. Despite this, Sub-Saharan Africa need not 
over rely on the gestures, but should rather put in more effort and commitment so that it 
can benefit as Brazil had. 
2.2.3.6-Provisions aimed at assisting Least Developed Country members 
 
This category is aimed only at guarding and protecting Least Developed Countries.142 
Although SDT provisions are stated for Developing countries, this category is made 
special only for least developed countries basing on the UN classification criteria on 
countries economic status. Three of the provisions under this category are definitely 
positive actions and are applicable to the AoA.143 
 
From a general perspective regarding the concept of SDT, one could say that, though 
its form and flexibility appears acceptable and though necessary for developing country 
members; it is not adequate enough to rely solely on SDT. It needs to be complemented 
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with other trade strategies. Whatever the case, the view of this paper is not to build any 
solid argument or detailed dynamics on SDT validity, but rather to establish and 
illustrate an overview of the concept for a better understanding before going into the 
crux of the matter. In this light, an overview of the AoA will follow suit, considering the 
fact that it also contains the basis of the subject-matter under discussion. 
 
2.3-The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
2.3.1- Introduction to and the Raison D’être for the AoA under the Multilateral 
Trading System (MTS) 
 
As mentioned earlier in chapter one, ever since the beginning of the GATT (with a 
Plethora of Rounds ranging from the signing of the Uruguay Round Accord in 1994), the 
most controversial issue has been the ongoing negotiations on agriculture.144 For 
instance, since post-World War II, industrial countries like the US (and Japan), sought to 
protect the agricultural sector because in an attempt to expand their manufacturing 
industries, it led to a simultaneous decline in their agricultural sectors. For instance, in 
Japan (1968), the income of non-agricultural products increased and surpassed that of 
the agricultural products, thereby leading to decline in the number agricultural workers, 
and a shift of active agricultural population to the non-agricultural industrial sectors.145 It 
is worthy to note that, non-tariff barriers to agricultural imports were to be tariffied while 
bound tariffs were scheduled in order to phase out reductions. Also, farm productions 
and export subsidies were to be reduced (mostly between 1995 and 2000), in order to 
prevent chaos in agricultural trade in the years prior to the formation of the WTO.146 
Finally, the AoA came into existence a decade ago owing to the Marrakesh Declaration 
establishing the WTO.147 Despite the fact that from the very beginning agricultural trade 
                                                             
144
For details on the history of and rationale for the AoA under the GATT, see Anderson, K. (1998) 
‗Agriculture, WTO, and the Next Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations‘ School of Economics and 
Centre for International Economic Studies, University of Adelaide, SA 5005 . For details on Agricultural 
protectionism, see also, Josling, T.E., Tangermann, S. & Warley, T.K. (1996), ‗Agriculture in the GATT‘ 
St. Martin's Press, New York, USA. 275-285. 
145
 Masaki, M. (2007) ‗Active Agricultural Population in Post War Japan‘ The Developing Economies, 
Vol.7 Issue 2, p 159-169 Avaliable:http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1746-
1049.1969.tb00527.x/pdf [31
st
 October 2010]. 
146
 See Anderson, K (1998), 1. 
147
 Recourse can be made to Para. 1 of the preamble on the AoA which states that the long term 
objective is ‗to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system‘, See also article 20 AoA 
which sets the base for the reform process of the AoA. 
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was given very little importance, the AoA later gained a legal status incorporated into 
the GATT legal text. It was aimed at setting the basis of its negotiation through the 
launching of a reform process of the Uruguay Round, regarding the three pillars of the 
AoA, and also to take a first step forward to achieve its long term goals as stated in the 
preamble.148It is in this light that the discipline of the agreement on Market Access, 
Export Subsidy and Domestic Support came into existence. By virtue of Article 20 of the 
AoA, these pillars were negotiated under the reform process (Built in Agenda) as 
elaborated below. 
2.3.2-The Legal Framework of the AoA and its structures 
 
Since the inception of the GATT, Agricultural negotiations, has been a controversial 
issue under the AoA. It is worth noting that the AoA rests on three pillars: Market 
Access, Domestic Support, and Export Subsidies. This structure was not mandated 
arbitrarily, but was dictated by the GATT because of the very nature of its loopholes that 
needed the AoA to plug them.149 Considering the controversies that surround the AoA, 
Desta describes the three pillars as a ‗three-pronged plug‘ into the agriculture specific 
loop holes under the GATT,150which has therefore extended under the Doha Round of 
trade negotiations.151 They are as follows: 
2.3.2.1- Market Access 
Market access is the most controversial and indispensable agenda under the AoA. It 
simply refers to the terms and conditions under which agricultural products (goods and 
services) could be imported within WTO member countries.152This could be done either 
when member countries relax their borders by phasing out or reducing NTBs or tariffs, 
respectively against foreign products. Though GATT had a preference for tariffs over 
NTBS, the need for import restrictions was solely for the generation of tax revenue, 
enforcement of internal health protection, protection of home industries, and technical 
                                                             
148
 See, Para.2 of the Preamble of the AoA. 
149
Desta, M. G. (2006), 3. 
150
Desta, M. G. (2006), 3. 
151
 For details on current issues on agriculture see Hhanrahan, C.E. &Schnepf, R. (2007) ‗WTO Doha 
Round: The Agricultural Negotiations‘ The World Trade Organization: another round, CRS Report for 
Congress, 87. 
152
Desta, M. G. (2006), 8. For definition on Market access, see Goode, W. (2003) Dictionary of Trade 
Policy terms (4
th
ed) New York, Centre for International Economic Studies, Cambridge University Press, 
232.  
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regulations which led to varying forms of barriers imposed by member countries via the 
rights conferred on them.153 Here two types of barriers exist: tariff and non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) by which members of the GATT were solemnly bound.154 The onus of justifying 
the imposition of agricultural import restrictions pursuant to these exceptions had always 
proved tough due to GATT‘s narrow interpretation.155 It is worth noting that the task at 
hand which proved challenging has always been the issue of converting non-tariff 
barriers into their tariff equivalence during the process of ‗tariffication‘.156 Nevertheless, 
under the Uruguay Round, those pre-existing NTBs were converted into their tariff 
equivalents. Irrespective of its consistency with GATT rules,157 they were criticised for 
their distortive nature as NTBs (border measures), reflected in the Appellate Body‘s 
report in the Chile-Price Band Case.158 Thus, despite an improvement in tariffication 
under the Uruguay Round, the system still receives criticism owing to continued future 
increase of very high tariffs and trade restrictions which go far beyond the former 
applied tariff and NTBs. It was therefore described as, ‗dirty tariffication‘.159 
 
Regards tariffication, both developed and developing countries were to reduce their 
bound tariffs on agricultural products by36% and 24% respectively. Also, regarding their 
minimum tariff lines, they were to reduce by 15% and 10%, over a period of six and 10 
years respectively.160 In as much as the leverage is brought down by 15% minimum, 
developed countries will maintain the advantage of protecting their sensitive products 
from tariff reduction. This is possible since all they needed was to attend the required 
leverage (15%) irrespective of the products tariffied.161 In this light, member states were 
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Desta, M. G. (2006), 8. 
154
 See articles II and XI of GATT 1947 for the binding of tariff reduction commitments and the abolition of 
quantitative restrictions. For the exceptions and few others, see also Article XI:2(c)  and Article XVIII 
which makes provision for the only agricultural specific exception in the GATT 
155
 For details about the debates see, Sumner, A.D., &Tangermann, S. (1998), 5-6. 
156
 See WTO Legal Texts, footnote 1 of Article 4(1) of the AoA. It enlists the NTBs that were to be 
converted to tariff equivalence.  
157
Desta, M.G. (2006), 9. See also GATT, (1994) article 4 (2), footnote 1 on the AoA concerning the 
tariffication exercise applied to a range of measures. 
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See, Appellate Body Report, (WT/DS207/AB/R, issued on 23 September 2002, Para 200. 
159
 For details on tariffication as regards the base period, See Desta, M.G. (2006), 9. s 
160
 See Para. 5 of the WTO, Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the 
Reform Programme (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24), 20 Dec. 1993. See also, GATT (1994) Article 15 (2) of the 
AoA. 
161
 Most of the sensitive products of developed countries were not exposed to tariff reduction in as much 
as they could reach an overall tariff rate/cut to the required minimum. See Gifford, M. &Montemayor, R., 
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obliged to establish tariff rate quotas162 at low or minimum duty rates in order to give 
effect to the minimum/current market access opportunity.163 Finally, members were 
obliged to make special arrangements that allow for the introduction of Special 
Safeguard (SSG) measures on tariffied products with less stringent conditions upon the 
imposition of import quantity surges (quantity restriction measures).164 
 
Currently under the ongoing market access negotiations, the most contentious issue is 
concerned with the extent of the amount of tariff reduction to be achieved and the 
desired targets which placed members at extremes. For instance, the US and the 
Cairns Group supported the ‗Swiss Formula‘165 which suggested harmonisation and 
reduction of all tariffs by 25% maximum (in an equal annual instalment of five years). 
Furthermore, the EC tabled a proposal, of which all tariffs were to be reduced at an 
overall average of 36% and a minimum tariff line of 15%.166 While, Developing countries 
were to apply the Harbinson‘s Three-tiered formula reduction as regards sensitive and 
special products, with SSGs, they were to maintain the terms and conditions of their 
high unbound tariffs. Lastly they were also given two special provisions to declare an 
unspecified number of products as ‗Special products‘167 for protection as well as the 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM).168 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
(2008)An Overview Assessment of the Revised Draft WTO Modalities for Agriculture, International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), 7-8. 
162
 For definition on Tariff Rate Quota, see Goode, W. (2003), 349. 
163
 Members were to maintain the pre-existing volume of agricultural imports of 3%. For details, see also 
paragraph 5 of the WTO, Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitment under the 
Reform Programme (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24),20 December 1993. 
164
 See Article 5 of the AoA whose conditions are less stringent than that of GATT article XIX. It applies 
annually to surges but not more than 30% of its bound rates. 
165
 ‗Swiss formula‘ is a term used to describe a tariff harmonization formula originally suggested by 
Switzerland during the Tokyo round of negotiations for tariff reductions in manufactured products. 
Notably, it is not supported by the Swiss in the current agricultural negotiations 
166
 See also The EC‘S Proposal for Modalities in the WTO Agriculture Negotiations. See also Binfield, J., 
Donnellan, T., Hanrahan, K., Hart, C. &Westhoff, P. (2004), ‗CAP reform and the WTO: Potential impacts 
on EU agriculture‘, American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado. 
Available:https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/3066/CAPReformWTO.pdf?sequ
ence=1 [20
th
 January 2010]. 
167
 The first original draft modalities applied the term ‗Strategic Products‘ and was designated with the 
symbol ‗SP‘ in their schedules all subjected to a uniform requirement of 10% average and 
5%, per-tariff-line minimum reduction regardless of existing tariff levels. 
168
  See details on Working Document No.5, ‗Overall Reduction of Trade-Distorting Domestic Support: A 
Tiered Formula‘, 9-10. See also WTO Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, and 6
th
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In brief, if the proposed market access modalities are implemented as specified on 
paper, it will lead to substantial increase in market opportunities for developing countries 
into developed country markets. Notwithstanding, to an extent the benefits would 
depend on the production capacity of these developing countries and their contributions. 
For instance, Brazil as a developing country is taking advantage by improving its 
agricultural R&D by virtue of Article 6.2 of the AoA which tolerates domestic support 
measures; Sub-Saharan Africa is reluctant to develop interest in agricultural R&D due to 
diverse political interest. 
2.3.2.2-Export Support 
 
Generally, export support refers to ‗subsidies that are contingent upon export 
performance‘ in various forms.169 They are defined as ‗direct payments (other financial 
contributions) by governments (any public body) provided to domestic producers or 
exporters considering the exportation of the goods or services‘.170 Under the SCM 
Agreement, they are deemed to be illegal for manufactured products since they are 
trade distortive per se, and are contingent upon export.171 Under the original GATT, 
subsidies were not subjected to any strict discipline; however member countries were 
obliged to notify these subsidies especially when alleged to be of any serious adverse 
effect on the trade interests of other country members.172 Therefore, during the 1954/55 
session of the GATT, Article XVI was modified and a two-tiered distinction was made 
between domestic and export subsidies.173 
 
Export subsidies flatly prohibited by the SCM Agreement were permitted under the AoA. 
Two categories exist as follows: listed174 and non-listed agricultural export subsidies. 
First, listed subsidies are subjected to reduction commitments of both volume (quantity) 
and value (budget) of exports. Thus as regards exports volume and value, developed 
countries were to reduce subsidies by 21% and 36%, respectively, at 1986-90 base 
period, over a six year implementation period. Whereas developing countries were to 
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See WTO Legal Texts, Article 1(e) of the AoA; see also Article 9 of the AoA (which contains all listed 
subsidies). See also, Gorter, H. et al on Export Competition Policies in Ingco, M.D. & Nash, J.D. (eds) 
(2004), 43.  
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Goode, W.(2003), 143. 
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 See WTO Legal Texts, Article 3 Para. 1,of the SCM. 
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 See Article XVI, Section A of the GATT. 
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 For details on Export subsidies, see Desta, M. G. (2006), 18. 
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 See WTO Legal Texts, Article 9(1) of the AoA. 
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reduce by 14% and 24%, respectively (only two-thirds of these obligations) over a 10 
year implementation period.175 It is worth noting that, by virtue of article 9 (1) of the AoA, 
only countries who listed their products in the schedule of commitments could benefit 
from listed subsidies.176 Second, with non-listed export subsidies, there is no schedule 
of reduction on commitments. However, these subsidies were not to be applied in a 
manner that will result in the prohibition of export subsidy commitments.177 Here, there 
exist three export support subsidies: export credits, export credit guarantees, and 
insurance programmes.178 These forms of subsidies have been criticised especially by 
developing countries for its too many adverse effects on international trade. 
 
At the Hong Kong Round, a vast majority of WTO members demanded a complete 
phasing out of all forms of export subsidies (the July 2004 package) with a dateline set 
for 2013.179However, the EC (a proponent of subsidies) strongly opposed both the idea 
of total elimination and the view of bringing it in line with the rules of non-agricultural 
products. Later, the Harbinson‘s first draft modalities proposed a formula by which 50% 
of export subsidies were to be eliminated over a five year period, and the other, over 
nine years in equal instalments.180 In addition, other issues were negotiated: export 
credit programmes, food aid and trade distorting practices regarding state trading export 
enterprises.181 Generally, negotiations on export subsidies have raised strong and 
staunch responses amongst members of the WTO. For instance, the EC who is one of 
the highest users of export subsidies stood against the view to phasing out all export 
subsidies.182 
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 See Articles 3(3), 8 and 9(2) (b)(IV) of the AoA. 
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 The countries are 25 WTO member countries; see Background paper on export subsidies by the 
Secretariat, TN/AG/S/8, 9 April 2002, Para. 4. 
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 See WTO Legal Texts, Articles 3(3) and 10(1) of the AoA. 
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 See WTO Legal Texts, Article 10 Para. 2, of the AoA. 
179
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2.3.2.3-Domestic Support 
 
This class of domestic support simply refers to assistance or subsidies (support) 
provided to agricultural producers for products used especially under the AoA, and are 
not contingent upon export.183 They comprise government measures of assistance 
which is either via direct184 or indirect185 payments to agricultural producers regardless 
of whether the products are exported. These forms of support occur in different ways 
ranging from direct budgetary transfers to highly disguised forms of market price 
support. They are intended to guarantee certain levels of income for agricultural 
producers and are implemented mainly either by setting up minimum artificial market 
prices, which is higher than world market prices or by providing direct budgetary 
transfers to agricultural producers.186 It is worth noting that, several domestic support 
measures have proved to be trade distortive in agricultural production and at the 
multilateral trade level whenever in an attempt to make producers/recipients better off.  
 
Considering the trade distortive measures, the AoA adopts a ‗positive list‘ approach, 
which in principle prohibits all trade distorting measures unless specifically permitted. 
Reasons being that, these measures are classified under three broad categories as 
follows: those available to all WTO members; those available exclusively to developing 
countries; and those available almost exclusively to developed and/or high-income 
developing countries. These measures are classified under three broad categories: 
Amber Box; Blue Box and Green Box Measures.187 They are explained below as 
follows: 
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 Direct support could be in the forms such as: decoupled from production, income support; structural 
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programmes. 
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(a.) Amber Box Measures 
From its traffic appellation, it is identified by a yellow light. These measures 
are noted for their significant and minimal trade distorting effects especially in 
market price support measures. They are prohibited to all members except 
the 35 member countries,188  who used them during the base period (1986-
88) as well as undertook the AMS189 reduction commitments in their 
schedules. As noted, only 35 members including Brazil and three other 
African countries190 were permitted to use these measures because during 
the base period, they had undertaken domestic support commitments. 
However, there exist an exception which grants a de minimis,191 levels of 
support and an SDT option made available to Developing countries. This 
exception has created a potential pitfall for the continual use of subsidies 
aligned to their huge domestic support. Reduction commitments under this 
category of subsidies are made applicable to total agricultural support and are 
not related to any specific agricultural sector.192 Despite the nature of the 
subsidies, several WTO Members193 have argued in favour of a total 
elimination of the Amber Box Measures.194 Nevertheless, this is a very crucial 
matter for it has not been properly decided, by member states considering 
that all subsidies are trade distorting per se. 
 
 
                                                             
188
  Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech 
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Agriculture, Special Session, Total Aggregate Measurement of Support, Note by the Secretariat, 
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(b.) Blue Box Measures 
Blue Box Measures are direct payments of about 85% or less than the base 
level of production, made to farmers under production-limiting programmes, 
upon fixed area (yields) not subjected to reduction commitments although 
they met the conditions sine qua non.195 These measures are excluded from 
the calculation of Total AMS and reduction commitments because they met 
certain important conditions. Though these measures apply to all WTO 
members; only nine with the EC (15 countries counted as one), have notified 
the WTO of the use of the Blue Box Measures, in at least one of the years 
(since1995 to 2003).196 Just as the Amber Box Measures, most member 
countries proposed to delete the Blue Box Measures from the AoA, 
transferring its contents into the Amber Box Measure and deal with it 
accordingly. However, this view receives staunch responses from proponents 
of the Blue Box Measures (those who have made maximum use of subsidies) 
as well as non-users like Switzerland and Korea (excluding the US which no 
longer maintains export subsidies). However, it is the US and the Cairns 
Group who led the camp proposing to scrap the Blue Box Measures. 
 
Currently under the ongoing negotiations on the Blue Box Measures, the 
issue has been whether to retain or to scrap them? Given a critical look, the 
first Harbinson‘s modalities proposal, expresses the desire to eliminate the 
Blue Box Measures and put its contents in the Amber Box category. 
Furthermore, it suggested to either subject the Blue Box measures to 
reduction commitments, or to keep them as a separate category per se, 
though subjected to similar disciplines as the Amber Box Measures.197The 
US-EU, jointly proposed decoupling (to cap) the total value of the Blue Box 
Measures at 5% of the total value of national agricultural production in each 
member country. On the other hand, the G20 countries‘ proposal called for 
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 GATT, (1994) Article 6(5) of the AoA. 
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 See WTO, Committee on Agriculture on Special Session, Blue Box Support: Note by the Secretariat, 
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the elimination of the Amber Box Measures together with Blue Box Measures. 
All these resulted in slowing down the ongoing negotiations. 
 
(c.) Green Box Measures 
Green Box Measures are expressly defined by virtue of Annex 2 of the AoA 
contained in a non-exhaustive list. Fundamentally, in order for a subsidy to 
qualify as a Green Box Measure, it must not distort trade or should effect at 
most just minimal distortion. Furthermore, funds must be provided by the 
government but not through higher VAT and it must not involve price support 
to producers.198 Most of these measures are usually considered as neutral, 
since they do not adversely affect trade. They include government assistance 
on food security measures, general services (such as pest control, training, 
infrastructural development) and food aid. Alternatively, member states are 
allowed to provide an unlimited amount of direct income support to their 
farmers but decoupled from production decisions and trade. They could also 
provide income, insurance and disaster relief services on non-profit 
conditions, and assistance for structural adjustment, environmental and 
regional development programmes. However, these subsidies must not be 
applied in excess of the actual losses suffered or extra costs incurred by 
governments during implementation of the programme. In this category, it is 
worth noting that 83 members lodged their notifications by 2004 though they 
started in 1995 (implementation year). Amongst, 68 had already provided 
Green Box notifications.199 This expresses some degree of mass 
improvement regards transparency, unlike the case with the Amber Box 
Measures. 
 
Regard the ongoing negotiations, some countries stood against the subsidies 
listed in Annex 2, on grounds that it is trade distorting due to huge amounts 
paid out by members as subsidies. In effect, they suggested abolishing it 
altogether, putting its contents under the category of the Amber Box 
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Measure.200 Thus while, others suggested putting a cap on the amount of 
money that could be spent, some suggested to narrow the scope of the 
measures which falls under the Green Box Measures, whereas a third 
category still proposed to enlarge the Green Box Measures with additional 
measures.201 However, it should be noted that the first Harbinson‘s modalities 
draft suggested that the provisions of Annex 2 be maintained subject to minor 
modifications on issues regarding direct payments to producers, decoupled 
income support, and government financial support for income insurance and 
income safety-net programmes.202 
 
From a general view as well as ongoing negotiations, the WTO distinction 
between trade distorting (non-green) and non-trade distorting (green) 
domestic support measures is contemplated at between 50-85% 
reductions.203 This has been a bone of contention among member states of 
the WTO to decide as regards the extent either to reduce and/or apply the 
subsidies.204 
 
2.4-Conclusion 
 
Generally, for a better understanding of the subject matter of this mini-thesis, recourse 
was made to both the concept of SDT and the AoA and an overview of the transition 
from the GATT to the WTO. It is worth noting that there is a strong correlation between 
SDT and the AoA regarding the participation of developing countries under the MTS, 
especially Sub-Saharan Africa which has a comparative advantage in agriculture. 
 
As mentioned earlier in the concept of SDT, three concerns were raised. First, the 
dilemma of members not agreeing regarding the legal enforceability remains a key 
                                                             
200
 See the proposal of a group of 11 developing countries in the WTO document (Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and El Salvador: 
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issue which has led to an unfolding debate. Second, there exists a difficulty within the 
WTO to establish a good and precise legal definition for SDT. Last, there exists the 
inability of the WTO to set a standard and well-recognised criterion for identifying the 
economic status of member states under the GATT/WTO (especially the developing 
group). Thus this continued practice on ‗self-designation‘, has attracted a lot of criticism 
on grounds that the WTO does not bother about the necessary implications, due to its 
inability to provide an adequate mechanism for establishing economic status of its 
members. Furthermore, the six forms of SDT were granted and incorporated in the 
GATT during the Uruguay round. However, from the very beginning, they were not 
intended as part of the GATT‘s agenda. It is worth noting that the concern of developing 
countries interest for more SDT lies on: protecting their infant industries against their 
developed counterparts, and to request for market access preferences to developed 
countries. 
 
Under the concept of the AoA, the key issues discussed were basically concerned with 
the strategies on the various subsidies as well as determining the extent to which they 
could be reduced and applied without necessarily distorting trade. These issues were 
set out in detail under the three pillars of agriculture (market access, export support and 
domestic support measures) under the AoA. Despite the nice architectural design of the 
‗three pillars‘ of Agriculture under the AoA, it has to an extent failed to achieve an 
appropriate goal on the reduction and elimination of subsidies therefore contributed in 
delaying the results of the ongoing Doha negotiations. Although member states could 
still find it difficult to agree on certain issues they in a way agreed to eliminate and/or 
reduce all subsidies by 2013. 
 
Without fear of contradiction, it could be said that, the slow nature of the ongoing 
negotiations is as a result of a desire by member states not agreeing on agricultural 
issues which is said to dictate the pace of trade negotiations in the WTO.205 As noted: 
while developing countries are more concerned about SDT, it is equally not supported 
by most developed countries; as well as the issue of total elimination of subsidies which 
is equally unsupported by some developed countries. However, the nexus between 
SDT and the AoA under the MTS leaves an open-ended relation from developing 
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countries‘ perspective (Sub-Saharan Africa) since with a comparative advantage in 
agriculture they are at the same time striving for more SDT in order to fit into the MTS. 
This is by virtue of the fact that about 70% of the GDP of most developing economies is 
obtained from the agricultural sector. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURE UNDER THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 
(MTS) 
3.1- Introduction 
Since the inception of SDT, Brazil was amongst the few developing countries that 
benefited from its application. Considering the fact that, both Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Brazil has a similar feature, a Brazilian experience in agriculture since the 1950s would 
be a good ground for Sub-Saharan Africa to draw lessons. In order to better understand 
the Brazilian position and success in agricultural trade, a brief background history of 
Brazil and the agrarian reform is necessary. 
Brazil is the world‘s fifth largest country and includes about one-half of the land mass in 
South America.206 It is bordered by its Latin American neighbours207 except Chile and 
Ecuador.208 As a ‗continent‘,209 it is fundamentally differentiated from its Latin American 
neighbours. For instance, it contains abundant and huge natural resource potential for 
growth,210 amplified by the availability of usable land space which is mostly composed 
of a tropical, but temperate climate in the south. This unique feature is as a result of its 
geographical position which crowns it the largest country in South America. Its location 
is complemented by a highly diversified ecological environment which makes it suitable 
for the production of a wide range of agricultural products.211 
In 1822, Brazil gained independence and was later proclaimed a Republic by the 
military government in 1889. At that point in time, Brazil was politically dominated by 
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Coffee exporters,212 until the rise to power of populist leader, Getulio Vargas in 1930. 
Furthermore, Brazil in 1985 underwent more than half a century of populist and military 
rule before the regime peacefully ceded power to civilian rulers.213 
After 20 years of civilian rule, the economy of Brazil became stable and continued to 
enjoy rapid development/solid economic growth and became one of the world‘s 
emerging economies (as a result of strong and well-developed industrial and agricultural 
sectors with expansive natural resources, accompanied with a large pool of labour 
force).214 The Brazilian economy dominates the South American continent and it stands 
as an initiator and/or active participant of the Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR),215 and many international organisations such as the International Bank 
of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Health Organisation (WHO), World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), and the 
United Nations (UN) and the WTO (Joined upon formation in 1st January 1995).216 
As the world‘s fifth most populated country, it has an estimated population of 
201,103,330 (July, 2010 est.).217 Moreover, the economy is rated the tenth largest in the 
world and has definitely become one of the world‘s largest agricultural exporters. 
Despite the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis, Brazil in 2010 succeeded to revive 
the confidence of its consumers and investors as it recovered from its down turns. As a 
result of this success, it was ranked the world‘s eighth best largest economy with a 
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purchasing power parity of $2.194 trillion (2010 est.).218Today, Brazil is South America's 
leading economic power and regional leader with an attractive scene for investment in 
agricultural products. Nevertheless, Brazil still suffers from the problem of highly 
unequal income distribution and crime which remains a pressing matter. In January 
2010, Brazil assumed a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council for the period 
2010-11.219 
The confidence created by the Brazilian economy to consumers and foreign investors 
contributed in developing a conducive environment for Brazil's agricultural 
commercialisation and investment. This is one of the underlying successes of Brazil‘s 
strategic growth in promoting and encouraging economic and social development as 
well as fostering poverty alleviation. It is worthy to note that, prior to the world financial 
crisis in 2007 inflation was stable at 4% with an economic growth rate of 5.4%. 
Concurrently, agriculture was growing at a rate of 5.3%, the industrial sector followed 
with 4.9% and the service sector with 4.7%. Empirically, the transition of the Brazilian 
economy over the past few years from export-led to demand-led growth has been at an 
unstable but steady rate predicting progress and expansion in the economy. In fact, 
these shifts helped the Government of Brazil (GOB), to pay off its debt, lowered interest 
rates, and cut back spending. It resulted in a trade surplus of $24.7 billion in 2008 
including a total export of $197.9 billion and imports of $173.2 billion.220 In summary, 
Brazil‘s economy is characterised by a large and well developed agricultural, mining, 
manufacturing, and service sectors. It outweighs that of other South American 
countries. Its presence in the world market has been expanding due to its realised GDP 
of $2.194 trillion (2010 est.).221 
The agricultural evolution in the Brazilian economy could be traced in a series of waves 
emanating from specific export booms ranging from the transformation of rural 
employment and incomes, to the expansion of an enormous land frontier. It is worth 
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noting that until the 1940s, economic growth in Brazil was almost entirely dependent 
upon the cultivation of few key agricultural commodities such as coffee and sugar.222 
3.1.1-The Role of Agriculture in the Brazilian economy 
 
Brazil is a major agricultural player in the MTS. Its fertile land and recent advanced 
farming techniques transformed the country from a net-food importer to a net-food 
exporter. This transformation was partially due to the available agricultural land in use 
(approximately 230 million hectares) which comprises of a total of about 6.9% of arable 
agricultural land in use,223 with 0.89% permanent crops224 and 92.18% of others 
crops225 (2005 est.).226 The agricultural sector makes a major contribution to the 
Brazilian economy for it stimulated economic growth and foreign exchange earnings. 
According to John Waino: 
Brazil‘s agricultural sector is the country‘s largest employer. Most of the 
growth in agricultural output during the last 10 years has come in the form of 
productivity gains, as farmers adopted new technologies and lowered costs 
in order to deal with competitive pressures caused by real exchange rate 
appreciation, the opening of markets to international or regional competition, 
and rising real wages. Higher yields have resulted from improved seed and 
pest control management and increased use of fertilizer and irrigation.227 
In 2008, the agribusiness sector (including production, processing, and distribution) 
contributed up to 25% of Brazil‘s GDP (crop production and related inputs comprised 
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18%, while livestock and related inputs accounted for about 7%). The contribution of 
Brazil‘s agribusiness on overall exports was 36% in 2008.228 Considering this, the 
economy is gradually becoming one of the world‘s largest agricultural exporters. 
According to the Agência de Notícias Brasil-Árabe (ANBA), the activity of Brazil's 
agricultural sector, grew by 6.5% in 2010, and is ranked second among the country's 
top-growing sectors. Furthermore, Brazil‘s economy grew by 7.5% last year (with 
agricultural contribution of 180.8 billion Reals (US$ 109 billion)) coupled with a GDP of 
3.675 trillion Reals (US$ 2.1 trillion).229 
According to FAO statistics (2008), Brazil is one of the world‘s top eight producers of at 
least twenty-eight different agricultural commodities.230 As mentioned earlier, being a 
number one coffee producer for more than a century, Brazil is currently a leader in 
sugar and frozen concentrated orange juice with a world market share of 82%.231 Brazil 
is ranked second in tobacco, ethanol, cattle meat (beef and poultry) and soybean 
production and is the largest in commercial cattle herd.232 The main export products in 
Brazil consists of coffee, soybeans, wheat, rice, corn, sugarcane, cocoa, citrus, beef, 
while import commodities includes machinery, electrical and transport equipment, 
chemical products, oil, automotive parts, and electronics (which favours agriculture).233 
Agricultural commodities have played a vital role in stimulating Brazil‘s growing trade 
deficit. For instance, an average annual growth rate of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of 
Brazilian agriculture between the period 1975-1998, and 1998-2002 was estimated at 
about 3.3% and 5.7% respectively. It was rated of having a signified growth and trade 
balance higher than the 1.8% growth rate achieved by US agriculture during 1948 and 
2002.234 Also, Brazilian agricultural GDP (all goods and services produced) from 2000-
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2010, grew annually at 3.67% (on average) with a country's overall GDP of an annual 
average growth of 3.59%.235 
During the post-war economic growth in Brazil (1950 to 1980), the economy received 
much attention on specialisation in and available attempts at agricultural development. 
Since 1950, the attention was centred on a structural change and sustained 
industrialisation with strong backward linkages into its intermediate capital goods 
sector.236 During this period, the Brazilian agricultural sector witnessed a series of 
drawbacks and government interventions.237 Thus due to the adoption of the Import 
Substitution Industrialisation strategy (ISI) and the rush to open markets and new 
technology, it led to high levels of indebtedness as a result of too much reliance on 
credits as well as inadequate infrastructural development of storage and transport 
facilities. Moreover, most of the soils were chemically poor and required high inputs of 
fertilisers in order to control the acidity content and replace the minerals which were 
very costly and led to high level of resource wastage. A review of Brazilian agriculture 
and policies would be recounted in two broad periods: The period of 1950 to 1980 
(three decades before the AoA) and from 1980 onwards (the period of liberalisation).  
3.1.2-A Review of Brazilian Agriculture and Past Government Policies 
Before the advent of structural changes in the Brazilian agricultural sector, the economy 
(during the colonial era) was solely a traditional supplier of farm products such as coffee 
and sugar.238 These changes date back to the early 1900s owing to an anti-agricultural 
bias of import substitution.239 However, during the 1940s, foreign competition 
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diminished, and importable goods became scarce. Accompanied with a fall in the 
demand of primary products, the GOB was forced to reduce coffee stocks to 
manageable proportions while accumulating large foreign-exchange balances.240Due to 
these changes, it implemented strategies in order to revive/transform the agricultural 
sector into a semi industrialised country.241 
It is worth noting that the Brazilian agricultural sector has undergone a series of 
evolutionary and structural changes in agricultural development including the problems 
faced and the specific roles/policies found in the different segments implemented by the 
society to tackle the problems.242 Below, the evolution of Brazilian agriculture would be 
reviewed in two broad chapters (in phases: 1950-63, 1964-73, 1973-80 and from 1980 
to present) dwelling on the institutional and policy changes as well as the various 
strategies implemented in capitalising the agricultural potentials (a response to the 
drawbacks).  
3.1.2.1-The Institutional Evolution of the Brazilian Agricultural Sector before the 
AoA 
The success story of the agricultural sector in Brazil is complemented by a series of 
transformations from the last three decades (prior to the AoA). These periods ranges 
from 1950-63, 1964-73 and from 1973-80. 
(A)- The Period 1950-63 
 
This period marked the beginning of horizontal expansion in Brazilian agriculture.243 
During this period, Brazilian overall agricultural exports products accounted for over 
90%. Under the ISI, the GOB implemented import substitution strategies244 which 
predominated and penalised exports. The main idea was to attract funds from external 
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financing in order to increase economic growth.245 As part of its strategy, mechanisms 
were implemented such as overvalued exchange rates, floodgate of quotas, tariffs, 
import licensing, direct government investment (subsidies) and import prohibitions on 
agricultural export activities were implemented.246 The protectionist view of the GOB 
was to implement a policy that could, stimulate supply (agricultural products) in the 
domestic market before it could allow exports from other countries in to the Brazilian 
territory. Akin to this, the Brazilian economy began to grow (a direct consequence of 
horizontal expansion) at a tremendous pace between 1949 and 1969 as agricultural 
GDP increased at a rate of 4.2% each year.247 In order to achieve this setback, selected 
agricultural imports such as machinery and tractors were given favourable exchange 
rates at lower taxes.248 Reason being that, in the 1930s and 1940s (the period of Great 
Depression and World War II), Brazil was isolated from the rest of the globe because of 
the practice of isolationism. Thus ISI was at the forefront being the main strategy to the 
GOB in an attempt to achieve economic growth.249 Nevertheless, the strategy did not 
last longer for its bias in favour of the industrial sector.250 
 
As regards the balance of trade, the Brazilian economy experienced a net implicit 
taxation of agriculture through its foreign trade policies.  Although the population of 
Brazil represented about 3% of the 1990 world‘s population, its share in global trade 
was estimated at less than 1% for half a century.251 As earlier mentioned, during the 
period of protectionism (1930-1960), ISI was the sole strategy for external financing by 
which the GOB could adopt and rely upon. For instance, the GOB implemented a food 
pricing policy which targeted solely urban consumers on the sale of domestic food crops 
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in the urban milieu. This marked out a market shift of resources into industries thereby 
contrasting sharply with the slow development of manufacturing before mid-1950s.252 
Notably, during the first phase of post war agricultural growth, the agricultural sector 
was accompanied with continued expansion of traditional export crop-activity. For 
instance, coffee expansion was noted in the Brazilian cities of Western Sao Paulo253 
and Parani254 associated with intensive labour force and sharecropping system (under 
tenancy arrangements). It is worth noting that the modernisation of agricultural 
production in the south of Brazil was limited to selected areas of mechanisation 
complemented by the use of imported tractors and other farm technological inputs.  
However, the federal government did very little regarding agricultural research as a 
result of inadequate finance, poor administration as well as underinvestment in human 
capital. Notwithstanding, research efforts were initiated by the state of Sao Paulo in the 
coffee and cotton sectors.255 As mentioned earlier, the lack of commitment by the public 
sector in agricultural investment was affiliated to a bias in the agricultural sector through 
foreign-trade, exchange-rate, domestic-pricing policies and increased politicisation of 
agricultural development policies on land-reform debates.256 
During the early 1960s, Brazil experienced a trade growth marked with a coffee boom 
from the late 1940s though it was accompanied with many controversies.257 This 
resulted in a public debate on issues for prospects on structural reforms (in the form of 
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agrarian and tax reforms) which were accompanied by the lessening of regional income 
disparities aimed at broadening the domestic market to meet its equity goals.258 
Finally, this period of Brazilian Agriculture was marked with a positive supply response 
as well as in other Latin American countries. Thus in case of any short fall in the 
performance of the ISI, it would have been attributed to ‗urban‘ and ‗anti-export‘ 
protectionist bias policies rather than to any negative effect of structural deficiencies in 
output. Therefore, this could be attributed to the protectionist policy (the ISI strategy) 
implemented by the GOB during the period of the Great Depression (the 1930s) and the 
effects of World War II (1940s). 
(B)-The Period 1963-73 
 
The second phase of post-war agricultural growth is a bit characterised with gradual 
transition from the ISI strategy implemented by the GOB back in the 1950s. It also 
marks the beginning of conservative modernisation from 1970259 as well as a slight 
transition from the inward-oriented import-substitution policy to an outward-oriented 
export-substitution regime (strategy).260 Later, the GOB gradually abandoned the 
protectionist policy in favour of trade liberalisation. As a good response to the impacts of 
protectionism, liberalisation was pursued as improvements were made on trade and 
exchange rate policies. During 1964, Brazil instituted a military administration under a 
military coup government which downplayed and eliminated significant land reform 
measures. It was aimed at promoting accelerated industrial growth which could attract 
massive and new foreign investment.261 However, this was not a pro-agricultural view 
for it resulted in significant bias against the agricultural sector with many issues left 
undone. These issues included inadequate finance from the public sector leading to 
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under investment in human capital, rural education, public health programmes as well 
as lack of agricultural research.262 
Nevertheless, during the transition period (1960s), an extensive coffee eradication 
program was instituted accompanied with new varieties of agricultural products. It was 
aimed at increasing productivity as well as reducing the oversupply of coffee that 
existed during the boom period (1950s). This programme spurred a relative increase in 
the output of domestic food-crops such as import-substitution on the promotion of 
domestic wheat. Furthermore, it laid a foundation for expansion of non-coffee 
agricultural exports such as soybeans and citrus products. In addition, new frontier 
areas were created in Goias and southern Mato Grosso for the expansion of domestic 
food crops; later it was extended to non-traditional exports.263 According to Cardoso E, 
the growth of trade during the 1960s and 1970s opened the doors for an agrarian and 
tax reforms debate.264 
Coupled with these attempts (from the 1930s to the early 1960s), a dominating strategy 
in the Brazilian economy was long established through the ISI in order to promote the 
manufacture of domestic agricultural inputs. These inputs included the use of tractors 
and related agricultural equipment, fertilizers and chemical inputs. Concurrently (1964), 
in an attempt to promote a more rapid modernisation of agricultural production, Brazilian 
policy makers laid emphasis on stabilising and reforming the structure of its financial 
markets. In order to achieve its goal, increase credit concessions were made and 
adopted as an important instrument of agricultural policy which aimed to 
attract/encourage investment in the sector.265 Furthermore, measures were 
implemented to eliminate price distortions that worsened the decade of inflation, as 
follows: government expenditure was curtailed, the wage sector was squeezed and the 
tax collection mechanism was improved with the institution of a Capital Market Law in 
1965.266 Gradually, there was a transition from the ISI strategy towards a period of trade 
liberalisation. 
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In conclusion, the second phase of post war economic growth could be termed a more 
relaxed period moving from protectionism, despite the existence of certain constraints 
on agricultural export activities. Besides, this period was characterised by a relative rise 
in domestic food-crop outputs, increased land concentration, implemented foundation 
for the production of domestic input supplies, mass introduction of agricultural 
mechanisation through cheap rural credit as well as the existence of area expansion. 
Regarding productivity, most of the increase was due to the placement of new lands 
under cultivation rather than the use of old agricultural areas to increase productivity. 
(C)- The Period 1971-80 
 
The third phase of post war agricultural growth is characterised by a profound 
expansion of exports in agricultural commodities particularly in both processed and semi 
processed agricultural products. It was considered a step forward to promote 
manufactured agricultural exports as well as stimulate economic development.267 In 
order to accomplish its goal, more efforts were made to expand and diversify the 
country‘s export structure. For instance, financial institutions were modernised, tax 
incentives were properly put in place in order to attract funds for backward regions like 
the south of Brazil especially in sectors like agriculture while government infrastructures 
were improved in the later sixties.268 Thus, in the early 1970s, the overvalued exchange 
rate system (on the implicit taxation policy on agricultural policies) was reduced though 
not eliminated. However, the underlying issue was neither to complete trade 
liberalisation nor to  achieve a good exchange rate policy, rather it was setup as a 
relative price protectionist‘s strategy intended to offset subsidies contingent upon 
exports (export incentive subsidies).269 It is worth noting that way back in the 1940s, 
where agricultural trade was highly protected prior to the GATT (1947) there was much 
use of export subsidies. The expansionist‘s policy promoted growth in processed and 
unprocessed soya bean export products due to government intervention via providing 
support to farmers. Nonetheless, it created room for discrimination in favour of industry 
over agriculture. For instance, the domestic food crops in Southern Brazil were being 
displaced by industrial exports. With this, it resulted in an interest in agricultural 
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mechanisation transforming the labour market (both in the Southern and South Eastern 
Brazil), from a tenancy system based on sharecropping arrangements to a large and 
growing temporary nonfarm-resident (seasonal labour force).270 As perceived from the 
trend taken (from a more government protectionist‘s view to a pro-trade liberalised 
implementation policies), the policy atmosphere of this phase seems more relaxed than 
the previous ones. 
It is worth noting that during the mid-1970s, agricultural credit271 reached proportions 
that were almost equal to the total gross value of agricultural outputs marking an 
improvement from the old school practice. This however led to a large diversion of funds 
for non-agricultural purposes as well as the substitution of borrowed capital by farmers 
through government loans. Consequently, it resulted in a substantial rise of an annual 
rate of inflation of between 40%-50% coupled with fixed nominal lending rates for 
agricultural borrowers at 15%.272 It resulted in high negative real interest rates for the 
Agricultural Bank of Brazil273 with only few borrowers able to contribute significantly to 
the wealth and income distribution in rural Brazil.274 This was accomplished through the 
establishment of a new regional shift in agricultural production, a restructured and 
financed national agricultural research strategy. 
 
First, through a new regional shift in agricultural production, alcohol was derived from 
sugar cane and manufactured as imported gasoline and biodiesel fuels.275 This product 
accounted for over 73% of Sugar Production in the state of Sao Paulo.276 Thus, the 
practice of subsidising cane cultivation (for ethanol production) at the expense of 
agricultural resources resulted to a debate on land availability.277 Second, due to a 
restructured and financed national agricultural research strategy, effort was made to 
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substitute domestically manufactured agricultural inputs with the use of tractors and 
agricultural machinery, fertilizers and chemical inputs (pesticides, herbicides, and 
fungicides) for imported products.278 This led to marked improvement and change in 
Brazilian agriculture crowning the period of modernisation. 
Unlike the first phase of agricultural growth (1950-1960), from the mid-1970s, farmers 
were pushed to pay considerably high import prices for farm products. This practice 
(under the import substitution strategy) became very costly in the earlier period. This 
was as because the costs of insurance and freight (CIF) were included. This shift was 
accompanied with the expansion of export-crop activity such as soybeans which was 
cultivated mostly in the Central West region (especially Southern Mato Grosso) with 
other agricultural activity in the Amazon region.279 This was marked by rapid growth with 
a series of structural changes composed of agricultural exports dated from late 1960s to 
1981-82. In particular, during the mid-1960s, the shift to unprocessed agricultural 
exports accounted for roughly 73% of the total exports while total agricultural exports 
accounted for 84%. Spontaneously by 1978, semi and completely processed 
agricultural products expanded at a remarkably fast rate at 29% of the existing total 
exports.280The dynamics of agricultural growth and diversification in the Brazilian 
economy was accounted for by transition from the export-substitution to trade 
liberalisation strategy. This was the very best of the responses which accompanied total 
elimination of both export protectionists and overvalued exchange rate policies that 
were noted for the existing distorting characters and severe inequities in the Brazilian 
agricultural sector. 
Generally, the Federal Government of Brazil in 1973 instituted and launched a National 
Research Agency (EMBRAPA). Its basic aim was to put in effect major international 
agricultural research centres with comprehensive investments focusing on a broad 
variety of crops in different ecological settings and most important was the 
implementation of the ‗Agricultural Priority‘ programme. First, a substantial amount of 
investment in human capital was negotiated in the form of scientists trained in the field 
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of agricultural sciences in many different international centres and foreign universities. 
Second, a new emphasis was developed on research in order to improve the 
productivity of small farmers. Third, efforts were made to discover technological 
breakthroughs in response to increase yields in the acidic soils of the frontier region (the 
Cerrado) of the Southeast and Central West of Brazil.281 
Conclusively, an analytical response on the evolution of past agricultural growth and 
institutional policies of Brazil expressed strong government protectionist‘s intervention 
and later gradual trade liberalisation (1950-1980). By virtue of this evolution, the 
Brazilian agricultural output composed of twelve major crops (out of which seven are 
exports and five were of major domestic products) accounting for over 98% of all total 
crop outputs in that period.282 More specifically, Brazilian agriculture performed well in 
its transition over the post war period (1950-80). For instance, Agriculture grew at a rate 
of 4.5% per year (on average) from 1950 to 1965 and almost about 5% per year (on 
average) from 1965 to 1980. This period disclosed responsive changing incentives and 
the opportunities that existed among Brazilian producers. Back in the 1950s, Brazil's 
agricultural drive and export performance was built around a set of traditional tropical 
crops such as coffee, sugar and cacao which underwent a series of trade booms. 
Today, it has contributed to the country as a key player in international trade via the 
practice of modernisation and crop diversification especially on agricultural exports 
products. 
3.1.2.2-The Institutional Evolution of Brazilian Agriculture from 1980 and the AoA 
 
 
From 1980, the growth of Brazilian Agriculture entered a new era highlighted by moves 
towards an AoA established under the Uruguay Round. Thus during the late 1980s, the 
GOB after learning from its past mistakes,283 adopted liberal and diversified multilateral 
trade policies which contributed enormously to the food and agricultural sector.284 Brazil, 
being one of the most heavily protected economies in the world, later in the period of 
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1988 to 1995, experienced a trend of improved trade. Thus its average nominal tariffs 
fell from 43.4% (1987) to 13.9% (1995) leading to a simultaneous fall in the rate of 
protectionism from 55.8% to 20.0%. This improvement impacted largely on the ratio of 
import/consumption trade flows across all manufacturing sectors from 15% (1986) to 
31% (1998).285 It is worthy to note that, as a result of the worsening economic 
downtrend experienced during the practice of protectionism, the GOB under the 
auspices of multilateralism brought down its tariff rates at average in order to redress 
the situation.286 
Unlike the past (1950-80), beginning from the late 1980‘s the GOB was no longer 
interested in protectionism rather trade liberalisation was the sole concern for economic 
growth. Thus there was interest especially in the agricultural trade sector which suffered 
most from discrimination under the ISI policy. It is worth noting that, agricultural export 
commodities played a critical role in stabilising Brazil‘s growing trade deficit. For 
instance, between 1994 and 1996, the agricultural sector contributed a sum of $25.3 
billion to trade balance, equivalent to an average of $8.4 billion per year.287 Prior to the 
period of agricultural expansion, 1983 was noted as a period of ‗agricultural crisis‘. It 
was characterised by a dramatic fall in agricultural output and a price explosion which 
led to a drastic increase in the wholesale sector at an agricultural price index of 336% 
unlike the industrial sector which rose only to 200%.  
Notably, during the mid-1980s and 1990s, agricultural production (especially in rice and 
corn) increased considerably due to elimination of discriminatory policies.288 At that 
same moment, Brazil experienced a variation on annual inflation rates, high external 
debts and years of negative economic growth. Consequently, its annual (1980) inflation 
rate stood at 100%, later increased to 200% (1983) before it went up to hyperinflation 
with annual rates of over 1,000%. This practice is related to the high rates of 
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government intervention in agriculture supported with the injection of credit in the soya 
beans sector.289 
At the beginning of trade reforms, the ISI strategy was abandoned during the rise to 
power by the populist democratic government. In addition several policies were 
introduced which favoured small producers of food crops (such as corn and dry beans) 
as well as consumers over producers of export-oriented crops. In effect, by 1987, Import 
Licensing was abandoned accompanied with programmes on the reorganisation of 
research and extension focusing on varieties of food crops rather than solely soy 
beans.290 
Due to inflationary crisis in the 1980s, Brazil by mid-1989 experienced an unserviceable 
foreign debt ($120 billion). As a result, exports quantitative restrictions were 
eliminated291 which has today placed Brazil at a better position to face the negative 
impacts of economic recession. Thus in recent years it has achieved strong growth 
accompanied with low inflation rates reflecting on the continued implementation of 
sound macroeconomic policies. For instance, import tariffs were averaged nearly at 
45% while the Real currency was severely overvalued. This policy bias made the 
investment climate in Brazil unfriendly.292 
Moreover, 1990-1992 was highlighted by the assumption of power by the Collor 
government. Many reforms were introduced under the Collor‘s Macroeconomic 
Stabilisation Plans. These plans were designed solely to modernise and revamp the 
economy293 in an attempt to increase foreign competition via trade liberalisation with 
flexible investment policies. In effect, the foreign exchange market was converted into a 
floating exchange rate in order to attract more imports, market import was deregulated, 
and the main non-tariff trade barriers (including trade licensing) were removed.294 This 
marked the genesis and the turning point of the Uruguay Round Negotiations towards 
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an AoA (under the WTO). Notwithstanding, 1993 was marked with the introduction of 
the Real Exchange rate peg under the Real Plan. It is worthy to note that, the evolution 
of Brazilian agricultural growth until date is open ended and continues in as much as 
Brazil remains an active participant under the MTS. 
From a general perspective, the post war phase of Brazilian agricultural growth (1950-
1980) highlighted multiple reasons for Brazilian economic growth under the MTS. Thus 
Brazilian agricultural growth (from 1950) has undergone tremendous improvement prior 
to and after the AoA. The subsequent subsections will elaborate on the various 
strategies (policies) implemented by Brazil in the agricultural sector. 
3.2- Strategies (policies) complementing the Brazilian Agricultural Sector 
 
During the post war agricultural growth in Brazil, specific agricultural sector policies 
were largely implemented to overcome the challenges faced.295 The strategies (policies) 
were intended to stimulate effective participation in the production sector296 as well as 
facilitate agricultural marketing, storage and transportation sectors in an attempt to 
reduce production costs and to enhance agricultural product prices. These instrumental 
policies involved the use of credit and fiscal mechanisms as well as price compatibility 
(on production costs and marketing guarantee). These were accomplished via the 
implementation of research and technology incentives; technical assistance and rural 
extension; agricultural insurance; cooperative activity; rural electricity and irrigation 
systems. Finally, housing was provided to rural workers with the use of land 
resources.297 These policies are discussed below as follows: 
3.2.1-Trade Policy 
 
From the beginning of the post war period of agricultural growth, the GOB implemented 
the ISI strategy. Until the 1980s, accompanied with the effects of economic crisis which 
resulted from the shocks of high prices in petrodollars, the GOB was pushed to 
reconsider international trade as fundamental to economic development. Thus MTS was 
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recognised as a contribution to fair and equal development with access to the world's 
largest markets being considered as indispensable to the creation of wealth and social 
progress to Brazil‘s agricultural products. Finally, they saw the spirit of south-south trade 
cooperation as necessary thereby recognising the need for more flexible rules at the 
multilateral level by developing countries.298 
 
As mentioned earlier, despite the fact that tariffs were re-established after 1979, most 
quantitative controls were gradually abandoned. In 1988, due to the gradual moves on 
trade liberalisation, the GOB (by 1990) embarked fully on privatisation and trade 
liberalisation due to flexibilities implemented on export subsidies and exchange rate 
policies.299 Consequently, all quantitative control measures were unconditionally and 
immediately eliminated and a schedule for tariff reduction was established.300 Thus by 
1997, nominal tariffs were rated on average (one-tenth) of what existed in 1987301in 
attempt to redress the worsened balance of trade deficit suffered during the crisis. The 
economy of Brazil underwent a lot of agricultural reform in order to stimulate growth.302 
Considerably, the economy has been on a good policy framework such as fiscal 
responsibility, income distribution and an inflation targeting regime which attracted a 
very solid Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)(totalled US$34.6 billion) in 2007.303 
Akin to these reforms, the GOB established a series of price stabilisation plans which 
operated under various regimes. First, the Crusado Plan in 1986, decreed by the 
Sarney government presented a definitive program to ‗de-index‘ the economy and wipe 
out inflation. The plan, was aimed at freezing prices upon foreign economic policies 
consisted primarily on fixing exchange rates. Second, the Bresser Plan was introduced 
by the new Minister of finance, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, in June 1987. It took over 
the Crusado Plan and was impregnated with lots of frequent small devaluation 
strategies to redress the existing domestic inflation. Furthermore, it promoted an 
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improved balance of trade which stimulated a fall in domestic demand and attained a 
current-account balance by 1987. In January 1989, the Summer Plan was introduced 
aimed at temporarily freezing wages and exchange rates.304 Thus in the late 1989, prior 
to the Collor de Mellor plan (March 1990), the Customs Policy Council (Conselhopara 
Política Aduaneira) issued ‗Resolution 1,666‘ to reduce the average legal tariff from 
41% to 35.5%. Under this regime, there was opposition to the intrusive and 
interventionist bureaucracy of corrupt and highly paid officials (marajás). In addition 
much emphasis was laid on deregulation and greater openness to world markets.305 
Finally in 1994, the Real Exchange Rate Peg was introduced under the Real Plan which 
aimed at stimulating agricultural productivity. 
Notably, since 1990 (coupled with the existence of the Uruguay Round of the AoA), as a 
result of international integration the Brazilian economy experienced mass improvement 
in agricultural products due to open markets. Thus gains were accomplished through 
the use of unilateral substantial reduction of tariff rates which fell from 51% to 12% (all 
on average). It is worth noting that, Brazilian participation in multilateral trade 
agreements expresses the desire and ability to bind itself to all tariff lines with 
substantial reduction commitments on import barriers.306 As a way forward, Brazil 
indulged in intra and extra-regional preferential trade agreements with its Latin 
American Neighbours and Free Trade Agreements (FTA with North American countries) 
in order to take advantage of regional trade opportunities.307 From the period of 1995, 
the Brazilian Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX) was charged with the functions of 
adoption, coordination, and implementation of trade policy in goods and services 
stipulated by Decree No. 4,732 of 10 June 2003.308 
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3.2.2-Institutional Policy 
 
During the last century, agricultural development services in Brazil were established 
with a modern extension in the state of Minas Gerais (1948). Later, the GOB promoted 
and encouraged an increase in the private sector participation in the agricultural 
economy. In order to accomplish its goal, the GOB instituted the Brazilian Company for 
Agricultural Research (EMBRAPA in 1973) as well as funded other research 
programmes (including cocoa, coffee, and limited sugarcane research programmes). It 
is worth noting that, the success of Brazilian agribusiness lies with EMBRAPA and other 
state research institutes including universities, private companies and non-
governmental organisations. Due to government intervention, the growing participation 
and involvement of the private sectors in agricultural research and development 
became so rapid. Thus a developed and well-coordinated massive R&D policy was 
tilted towards a more sustainable agricultural system.309 Credit volumes were increased 
and linked to support policies of stock management, improved distribution and the 
commercialisation of food and agro industries. Consequently, it amounted to a better 
allocation of resources, increased and improved productivity, and product quality 
accompanied with reduced food prices.310 These attempts fell within the recent basic 
aims of EMBRAPA‘s first 5-year plan (the Plano Diretor for 1988 to 1992).311 
 
EMPRAPA a public company attached to the Ministry of Agriculture is funded mainly 
from the Federal budget. According to a report from Director, Gasques, between 2003 -
2010, over 270 billion Reals (US$ 163 billion) were allocated as agricultural credit in 
Brazil.312 It is worth noting that Brazil has invested over 1.0% of its GDP in agricultural 
R&D.313 Thus the Director‘s view is supported by EMBRAPA‘s fundamental aim, which 
basically seeks to address the needs of Small-Scale and Resource-Poor Farmers via 
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the introduction of new agricultural technological needs.314 Coupled with the above 
mentioned, are efforts made by EMBRAPA to generate new technology for modern 
commercial farmers. Indeed this entails a lot of money to be incurred since it involves 
massive investment. This should therefore serve as a lesson for Sub-Saharan 
governments whenever issues of agricultural investment are concerned. 
Moreover, the GOB at all Federal levels created and fused both the Brazilian Company 
for Technical Assistance and Agricultural Extension (EMBRATER 1973) with the 
Network of State Extension Companies (EMATERs).315 As a result, the GOB 
encouraged and influenced increased private sector participation in order to play a 
greater role in agricultural trade. For instance, EMBRAPA coordinated agricultural 
extension moves, provided training assistance, methodology, work programming, 
financial advice and communications to Brazilian farmers.316 By virtue of the recent 
publication of law 12,383, EMBRAPA now gains autonomy to operate abroad unlike 
before when its functions were limited within the national territory.317 Furthermore, the 
GOB provided continued field assistance to farmers, private extension consultants, 
including employees of producer cooperatives (such as private extension consultants, 
input and machinery suppliers) and contracted producers of agro industrial enterprises. 
Without prejudice, the role of the GOB remarkably influenced private sector participation 
instituted as a strategy to boost agricultural growth. Thus, private extensions and 
agricultural supply companies such as the EMATERs were and are very active with the 
use of regular and skilful strategies developed in addressing farmers in the commercial 
sector. Moreover, network agricultural programs were created under a new production 
technology which featured especially via major TV stations and parent publishing 
houses, and were published in monthly agricultural magazines.318 
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3.2.3-Fiscal Policy 
 
In an attempt to regulate Balance of Trade Deficit (BOP) thereby reducing inflation, the 
GOB implemented responsive budgetary and tax policies that could achieve credit 
objectives.319 Thus the GOB implemented strategies that targeted rural credits with 
inclusive selected bank control credits at fixed rural credit interest rates (direct 
financing).320 For instance, a peculiar arrangement was developed which enabled the 
government to bypass its fiscal budget, a policy instrument which contributed to control 
both the quantity and price of rural credits.321 As a result, the GOB in1979, devalued the 
Real by 32%, unified the free and floating exchange rate markets as well as eliminated 
several export subsidies.322 Thus in order to achieve liberalisation, the GOB established 
(1997) an export credit guarantee fund (Export Credit Insurance-ECI) to bolster 
Brazilian agricultural exports. Consequently, exports rose by 246.90% from US$3.3 
billion to US$8.2 billion between 2004 and 2008.323 Nevertheless, in mid-1994, the Real 
Plan (1994-1998) brought inflation under control which fell from four digits in June 1994 
to two digits in June 1998, and subsequently to 35% in June 1998.324 Despite, the aims 
of the Real Plan (1995 and 1998), there existed a strong Real exchange rate 
appreciation which led to a collapse of the domestic currency (1999) resulting in a more 
flexible exchange rate regime.325 This is one of the contentious issues faced by the 
Brazilian agricultural economy which resulted in an attempt to expand agricultural land 
solely for productivity and food security. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that both the 
Banco do Brasil and the Banco Central do Brasil have acted as main providers of rural 
credit to desperate Brazilian farmers for agricultural investment.326 
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3.2.4- Land Development Policy 
 
The issue of land development has been a bone of contention in the Brazilian economy 
since colonisation. In1985, the GOB implemented the National Plan for Land Reform 
(PNRA) in attempt to expropriate land in the interest of the landless settlers.327 Its basic 
aim was to create a colonised government land project centred especially in the 
Amazon.328 It is worth noting that, the 1988 Brazilian Federative Constitution 
incorporated provisions which supported land reform and expressed that land must fulfil 
its ‗social function‘. Thus land must be made productive according to certain clearly-
specified criteria329 such as encouraging agricultural production. Most importantly since 
1971,330 the GOB in an attempt to fight against food security, limited the outright 
purchase of rural farmland by foreigners (companies owned by aliens). Thus under the 
former government of President Lula da Silva (2010), land acquisition laws331 were 
tightened332 and reinterpreted restricting foreigners (speculators) from indulging too 
much in foreign investment in agricultural land. Brazil‘s land acquisition policy was 
influenced by acts of wanton acquisition of agricultural lands in Sub-Saharan Africa by 
foreign governments (China, South Korea and the Gulf states) on grounds of food 
                                                             
327
 PNRA was later on replaced by Instituto Nacional de Colonizaçãoe Reforma Agrária (INCRA), the 
government‘s land reform agency under a new policy pattern for land reform. 
328
 Alston, L.J., Libecap, G.D. & Mueller, B. (1999) ‗A model of rural conflict: violence and land reform 
policy in Brazil‘ Environment and Development Economics, vol. 4, no. 02, 3. Available: 
http://siti.feem.it/gnee/pap-abs/mueller2.pdf[24
th
 March, 2011]. 
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 See, Chapter III of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Reformed in 1996; World Bank 
Review of Brazilian Agriculture, (26
th
 July, 1990), Annex 6 on Selected Topics in Land Tenure, 1-9. 
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 Land acquisition law of 1971 was incorporated by Law No. 5,709, of October 7, 1971 which is 
regulated by Decree No. 74,965, of November 26, 1974 and provides that individual foreigners with 
residence in Brazil cannot acquire more than an area equivalent to 50 units of rural land. 
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 This Official Gazette of the Union (Diário Oficial da União - DOU) was issued in August 23, 2010 with a 
published Legal Opinion CGU/AGU Nº 01/2008 - RVJ, dated September 3, 2008. Available: 
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th
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than 10%. However, under the Controladoria Gerald da União (a federal agency in charge of assisting the 
President in matters relating to defending the Public Assets of foreigners and other related issues on 
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25% of the total area of the municipality where the company is located. Notably, the law does not apply 
retrospectively thereby it does not invalidate previous land acquisitions. Available: 
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp1_l205402194_Brazil [6
th
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security which has almost contributed to very high risk of Sub-Saharan African countries 
losing their agricultural land to these rich countries.333 
3.2.5-Agricultural Commodity Marketing and Pricing Policy 
 
As mentioned earlier, agricultural growth in Brazil is attributed to increased productivity, 
lower prices for imported inputs coupled with increased agricultural land use areas. As a 
result, the GOB operated a minimum price programme for selected agricultural 
commodities such as rice, beans, cassava, maize, soya beans and cotton. Thus in each 
planting season (yearly), a minimum producer price plan is announced for the 
forthcoming crop season. Thus during harvest times, crops are acquired by government 
via direct purchases, and of storage loans to producers, handlers and cooperatives. It is 
worth noting that, such mechanisms were used to determine the value of production 
credit for official use. This scheme was aimed at stimulating the production of 
commodities, stabilise annual and seasonal price uncertainty and also to regulate public 
and private stocks deemed to be consistent with the price stabilisation objective.334Prior 
to this reform, a government agency(Superintendencia Nacional de Abastecimento 
(SUNAB)) was set up aimed at regulating distribution, set up prices and profit margins 
of basic foodstuffs at all levels. Furthermore, the Companhia de Financiamento da 
Producao (CFP) was instituted aimed at assisting in direct government purchases of 
commodities at minimum guaranteed prices.335 According to the Director of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Planning, Gasque, commodity prices have played an important role in 
the GDP growth rate especially during the second half of 2010 which highlighted 
exports in specific product sectors (coffee, orange, wheat and cane).336 Thus the 
processes of marketing loans were facilitated which enabled producers to carry on 
production and repay their loans when due and after their products were sold at the 
current market price or delivered to the CFP at the minimum price. Though this strategy 
does not on its own accounts to the success of Brazilian agricultural trade, it is but 
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Fox, R.F. (1979) ‗Brazil's minimum price policy and the agricultural sector of northeast Brazil‘, 16. 
335
OECD, (2005), 71. 
336
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obvious and certain that it contributed enormously in targeting the low income farmers 
who indeed formed the majority of Brazilian farmers. 
 
3.3- Brazil in Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Agreements 
 
Upon Brazil‘s accession into the WTO in 1995, MTS was regarded to be at the top of its 
trade policy while preferential agreements were looked upon as complements to the 
system. As an original member of the GATT, Brazil is considered as one of the most 
active participants in promoting trade liberalisation under the WTO. As a result, it has 
undertaken commitments under market access, domestic support and export 
competition disciplines. Under the MTS, Brazil has submitted proposals337 to various 
issues under the WTO; most relevant, it made a large number of notifications under the 
AoA.338 Furthermore, in an attempt to resolve disputes (especially in agriculture), Brazil 
has made recourse to the WTO dispute settlement (DSU) mechanism in the areas of 
subsidies, antidumping and countervailing measures.339 It is worth noting that, one of 
the most famous and successful Agricultural dispute ever initiated in the WTO by Brazil 
is the US-Upland Cotton Case.340 Brazil‘s success in this case, has acted as a lesson 
for most Sub-Saharan African countries especially the C4 countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Benin and Chad) under the DSU.341 
 
As a major exporter of both agricultural and agro-industrial goods, Brazil under the 
Cairns Group, adopted a massive and aggressive negotiating in favour of agricultural 
trade liberalisation.342 It is worth noting that Brazil‘s quest for agricultural trade 
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Details on Proposals by Brazil, is available: 
http://search.wto.org/search?q=WTO+Proposals+by+Brazil&site=English_website[29
th
 March, 2011]. 
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 Details on notification by Brazil to the WTO, 
available:http://search.wto.org/search?q=brazil%27s+notifications+in+the+WTO&site=English_website[29
th
 March 2011]. 
339
Brazil participated as a complainant in 25 cases, respondent in 14 cases and as third Party in 61 
cases, available:http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/brazil_e.htm#disputes [29
th
 March 
2011]. 
340
 See Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton  (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU 
by Brazil, WT/DS267/RW and Corr.1, was adopted 20 June 2008,  modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS267/AB/RW, DSR 2008:III, 997 to DSR 2008:VI, 2013.) 
341
 In August 2006, Brazil expressed dissatisfaction to the WTO DSU, and initiated a case against the US 
policy on the use of excessive export subsidies by its Upland Cotton farmers. See also: Zunckel, H.E.; 
(2005) ‗The African Awakening in United States-Upland Cotton‘, Journal of World Trade 39(6): 1071; 
Kluwer Law International: The Netherlands. 
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liberalisation343 extended from the Uruguay Round towards the Doha Round with much 
emphasis laid on the issue of market access.344 Moreover, in months preceding the 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún (September 2003), Brazil in coalition with the 
G20,345 pushed for ambitious agricultural reforms against the developed countries 
requesting for flexibilities that favoured developing countries.346 Brazil‘s bargaining 
position was not only driven by the internal setups of agricultural negotiations under the 
WTO, but due to broader shift in the country‘s foreign economic policies. For instance, 
Brazil‘s trade negotiation strategies were drifted towards a view of the North-South as 
well as South-South cooperation which acquired a growing relevance. In addition, Brazil 
has and is a still a participant (member) in several coalitions of the NAMA-11 and 
Friends of Antidumping Negotiations (FANs)347 and ‗W52‘ sponsors.348 
3.3.1-Brazil’s commitments and implementation under the AoA 
(a)- Import Measures 
All agricultural and food commodities imported to Brazil are subjected to ad valorem 
tariffs. It is worth noting that, no specific tariffs, tariff-rate quota (TRQ) or special 
safeguards are imposed. Owing to Brazil‘s agricultural reform and upon the application 
of an average MFN tariff for agricultural products, its bound tariff was drastically 
reduced from 58.8% (1995) to 35.6% (2004).349 
                                                             
343
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domestic support schemes. 
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Furthermore, the minimum and maximum tariff lines for Brazilian agricultural products 
are in line with WTO obligation, ranging from 0% to 55% maximum. Brazil‘s simple 
applied average MFN rate for agricultural products was 10.4% in 2004 which later 
reduced to 10.2% in 2009. The extent to which Brazil pursued trade liberalisation is 
expressed by improvements in its market access and economic growth. For instance, 
Brazil‘s bound tariff on agricultural products for 2009 was reduced to 35.4%350 though 
three times greater than the MFN applied rate of 10.2% (2009 est.). It is worth noting 
that the average tariffs for Brazilian agricultural products are lower than that of other 
goods. Nevertheless, a number of internal measures were put in place to assist 
agricultural production.351 
Prior to the Uruguay Round, Brazil undertook agricultural tariff rate quota (TRQ) 
commitments on wheat, apples, and pears.352 Thus in 2004, Brazil notified other WTO 
members of its intention to eliminate the TRQ, however, it was never opened for 
wheat.353 It is worth noting that, Brazil did not reserve the right to apply SSG for 
agricultural goods.354 Nevertheless, Brazil has applied preferential tariff quotas under 
the MERCOSUR without constraints from the WTO market access commitments.355 
Furthermore, the GOB applies a range of non-tariff measures in agricultural trade which 
includes: Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) requirements, regulations to Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT), Non-automatic Import Licensing, Certification and Customs 
Valuation.356 Relatively, Brazil‘s schedule of commitment have imposed higher tariff 
rates for beverages, spirits, dairy products and sugar  but are lower for live animals, cut 
flowers and plants as well as oil seeds.357 
 
                                                             
350
It is estimated to have reduced by 0.2% against 35.6% in 2004 marking the final year of the 
implementation period of developing countries. 
351
Such measures included the existence of guaranteed producer prices and credit at preferential rates 
with a 25% reserve required from banks as part of demand deposits for agriculture.   
352
A 10 000 tonnes metric TRQ was opened for both apples and pears but was never applied since 1998 
because the MFN tariff is lower than the in-quota rate of 15%.   
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 WTO (2009) ‗Trade Policy Review Brazil‘ Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/212/Rev.1, (09-
2317)11 May 2009, 96, para 14. 
354
OECD, (2005). 
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(b)-Export Measures 
 
Brazil is among the 26 members states of the WTO that has reserved the right to use 
export subsidies under the Uruguay Round Agreement. Brazil‘s domestic support 
measures for agriculture includes the provision of agricultural credit at preferential 
conditions, price support measures and stabilization mechanisms, and option contracts. 
In 2007, Brazil‘s Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) for 2003-04 went below a de 
minimis level(less than 10%) of the value of production.358 Moreover, Brazil also notified 
measures that exempted its reduction commitment on production (rural) credit for low-
income and resource-poor producers. It also included funds for investment credits of 
US$97.6 million, and US$280.5 million, respectively.359 Despite the fact that Brazil does 
not have a specific agricultural export credit programme, it has a number of export credit 
programmes (See Table 3.1): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
358
 For instance most of the AMS notified by Brazil corresponded to the minimum support prices under the 
Policy of Guaranteed Minimum Prices (PGPM) and the Premium per Output Flow (PEP) programme. 
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Table 3.1 Main Agricultural Support Measures and Programmes 
(R$ million/US$) 
PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 
i)Rural Credit360 Financing of agricultural activities at rates 
controlled and fixed by the Government 
51,200 (2007) 
(US$28.4 
billion) 
ii)BNDES/FINAME361 
and Automatic for 
agriculture  
Financing of specific agricultural activities, 
including the acquisition and maintenance of 
machinery and equipment, at preferential 
conditions  
3,600 (2007) 
(US$2 billion) 
iii)Programme to 
Strengthen 
Family Farming 
(PRONAF)362 
 
Support for family farming, artisan fisheries, 
aquaculture, livestock, and extraction of forest 
products 
8,400 
(2006/07) 
(U$S4.67 
billion) 
iiv)Policy of 
Guaranteed 
Minimum Prices 
(PGPM)363 
Price support mechanism 2,100 (2007)a 
(US$1.17 
billion) 
a- Net cost to the Treasury.  Source: Information provided by the Brazilian 
authorities.364 
During a September 2008 WTO Agricultural Committee Meeting, Brazil‘s estimated 
expenditure for 2008/2009 support programmes stood at approximately US$40 billion. 
According to Brazil, most of the measures (such as the Programa Nacional de 
Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar-PRONAF programme) would continue to be 
                                                             
360
WTO, (2009) ‗Trade Policy Review Brazil‘ Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/212/Rev.1, (09-
2317)11 May 2009, 96, paras. 20-29. 
361
WTO, (2009) WT/TPR/S/212/Rev.1, 96, paras 30--32. 
362
WTO, (2009) WT/TPR/S/212/Rev.1, 96, paras. 30-32.  
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WTO, (2009) WT/TPR/S/212/Rev.1, 96, paras, 36--37. 
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classified under the SDT provisions of Article 6.2 of the AoA excluded from calculation 
of the AMS.365 
First, under the rural credit programme, policy thrust was shifted from granting direct 
credit while ensuring that credit from the financial system was allocated to agriculture at 
preferential market rates. Under this policy, the National System of Rural Credit (SNCR) 
was charged to grant credit to farmers from both public and private sources at fixed 
government interest rates.366 However, according to the OECD, this policy affects 
overall allocation of credit, both within and beyond agriculture.367 Nevertheless, 
agricultural credit got its legal base from Law No. 4,829, of 5 November 1965 recently 
amended by Law No. 11,718, of 20 June 2008. Moreover, the Central Bank through the 
Agricultural Credit Manual provided credit to the public, modified each year by the 
National Monetary Council (CMN).368 
Second, the BNDES (FINAME) Agricultural Credit Company provides credit for the 
acquisition and maintenance of machinery and equipment. It also included irrigation 
systems and domestically manufactured refrigeration equipment. BNDES finances up to 
100% of investment and applies under different conditions to foreign-owned companies. 
Thus since early 2004, it has administered many agricultural credit programmes.369 
Third, the PRONAF370 whose structure was modified by Resolution BACEN No. 3,559 
of 28 March 2008 was later modified by Resolution BACEN No. 3,589 of 30 June 2008. 
Since 1 July 2008, it attempted to simplify the process of obtaining credit, eliminates 
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 WTO 2008 Report on Negotiations in Agriculture, Document G/AG/R/52, 11 November 2008. 
366
Despite the fact that Rural credit programmes were criticised by OECD for being trade distortive, they 
weredesigned primarily to benefit producers who did not have access to commercial credit. 
367
 OECD (2007), Agricultural Policies in Non-OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation. Chapter 2: 
Brazil, 44.  
368
Rural credit can stem from different sources: such as 25% of banks' demand deposits as mandatory 
resources which may be granted for production, investment or marketing, to farmers and cooperatives, or 
persons engaged in production or insemination research, fishing, or in activities providing certain services 
to farmers; rural savings; constitutional funds, the Workers Support Fund (FAT), and agricultural federal 
programmes managed by the BNDES. 
369
 The programmes are: Tractor Fleet Modernization Incentives Programme (MODERFROTA); 
Incentives Programme for Irrigation and Storage (MODERINFRA); Cooperative Development Programme 
for the Enhancement of Agricultural Value Added (PRODECOOP); Programme for the Modernization of 
Agriculture and the Conservation of Natural Resources (MODERAGRO); Credit Cooperatives 
Capitalization  Programme (PROCAPCRED); Incentive to Investment in Agribusiness Programme 
(INVESTIAGRO); Agriculture-Livestock Integration Programme (PROLAPEC); Warehousing Incentive 
Programme for Domestic Cereal Producers; and Programme of Commercial Planting and Recovery 
Forest (PROPFLORA). 
370
See also, MDA Available: http://www.mda.gov.br/portal/saf/[31
st
 April 2011]. 
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several financing categories and replaced them with a single category entitled ‗Family 
Farming‘.371 By December 2006, the Price Guarantee Programme for Family Farming 
(PGPAF)372 was attached to the PRONAF.  
Fourth, Brazil under the Policy of Guaranteed Minimum Pricing Scheme, grants support 
to selected agricultural products through the various price support schemes.373 These 
schemes included production of commodities such as coffee, corn, cotton, milk, rice, 
rubber, sorghum and soybeans. According to the OECD, falling international prices will 
lead to a rise in market price support.374 Consequently, the scheme led to improvement 
in trade liberalisation and Brazil‘s ability to meet up with WTO commitments. 
Other agricultural domestic support measures in Brazil are as follows: Rural Product 
Certificate (CPR),375 Aid to Development of the Agricultural Sector Programme,376 
Brazilian Coffee Fund (FUNCAFE),377 Household Agriculture Insurance Programme 
(SEAF),378 Agricultural Activities Guarantee Programme (PROAGRO),379 and Sugar 
                                                             
371
For details on this this group, see: WTO (2005) Trade Policy Review: Brazil. 
372
 The PGPAF carries out an indexation of credit taken by small farmers whose price is fixed at the time 
the credit is granted. The value is then converted to an equivalent in volume in terms of the product 
financed. Upon repayment of the credit, if the price of the product financed has decreased, the farmer will 
benefit from a discount from the monetary amount due, and will pay back the equivalent of the expected 
physical production. 
373
They include the following: Premium for Product Outflow (PEP) and Outflow of Product Value (VEP); 
Public Option Contracts; Private Option Risk Premium (PROP); and the Agricultural Products' Sale Option 
Private Premium (PEPRO). 
374
OECD, (2007), 35. For instance, in 2005/06 the volume of crops benefiting from price support doubled, 
with an extension of price guarantees to soybeans for the very first time. Moreover, as observed, by 
limiting the regional coverage of price guarantees the government in the past had sought to limit the 
coverage of support to smaller farmers, but later payments breached this implicit objective and create a 
worrying precedent. As a result, a downturn in market conditions was widely anticipated.  
375
 This financial instrument was created by Law No. 8,929 of 22 August 1994. According to it, the issuer 
(a farmer or a cooperative) sells his crop prior to the harvest and receives cash, assuming an obligation to 
deliver a certain amount of commodities at a future date in a specified place. The CPR then receives 
offers for guarantee from the Banco do Brasil and other banks, as well as some insurance companies. 
376
 By virtue of Ministerial Act MAPA No. 367/2005, as amended by Ministerial Act No. 623 of 7 July 2008, 
it is aimed at developing infrastructure in the agricultural sector with motivation to increase 
competitiveness. 
377
 By virtue of Decree No. 2,295 of 21 November 1986 and managed by the Banco do Brasil this organ 
finances research and infrastructure projects for the coffee industry in Brazil. 
378
 Also known as PROAGRO MAIS, it was established by Resolution CNM 3,234/2004, and exclusively 
covers farmers that enrolled in the PRONAF programme as they receive guarantees for 100% of the 
credit offered, plus 65% of estimated future net revenues only up to a total of R$2,500 per farmer. 
Recently, the Brazil Specialty Coffee Association (BSCA), in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Supply, plans to promote a series of activities (on specialty coffee) for the promotion of 
trade abroad. After the fair, the idea is to promote a trip of a group of importers to Brazil between June 
and August (2011).The efforts by the Ministry of Agriculture has shown the interest and support that the 
GOB in the agricultural sector. See: ANAB, 
available:http://www2.anba.com.br/noticia_oportunidades.kmf?cod=11689579[1
st
April 2011]. 
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Crop Guarantee Programme Garantia Safra and the New Biodiesel Programme 
announced by the GOB.380 
In conclusion, the agricultural policy of Brazil is in line with WTO obligations under the 
AoA. This is supported by a drastic reduction of Brazil‘s tariffs in 1995 upon accession 
to the WTO to 36.5% in 2004. It is worthy to note that, Brazil‘s success in agricultural 
trade lies under Article 6.2 of the AoA which permitted the use of the Green Box 
Measures. In this light, Brazil embarked on mass R&D in the agricultural sector as a 
strategy for economic growth. 
 
3.3.2- Brazil in Bilateral Trade Agreements on Agriculture 
 
By virtue of Article XXIV (5) of the GATT 1947,381 Brazil under the WTO actively 
pursued Regional Customs and Free Trade Agreements. These groups were regarded 
as complements to the MTS with the aim to enhance its interest in South-South trade as 
thereby promoting growth and development in the Agricultural sector.382 
 
First, upon the accession of Brazil to the WTO (1995), it initiated integration among its 
Latin American and Caribbean neighbours through the creation of a major regional 
trade agreement called the MERCOSUR.383By virtue of Brazil‘s influence under the 
MERCOSUR, regional benefits384 were extended to Bolivia and Chile as well as to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
379
 This organ was established by the GOB under Law No. 5,963/73 as a short-term credit guarantee 
scheme regulated by the National Monetary Council (CMN), administered by the Central Bank. The 
premiums paid by farmers are determined according to the crop risk which ranges from 1.2% to 6.7% of 
the total credit. 
380
 This organ is regulated by the following laws:  Law No. 11,097 of 13 January 2005, Law No. 11,116 of 
18 May 2005 and Law No. 10,848 of 15 March 2004, Decree No. 5,448 of 20 May 2005, Decree No. 
6,006 of 28 December 2006, and now Decree No. 6,606 of 21 October 2008. This programme 
established a minimum blending ratio as operated for ethanol and created a certificate (the Social Fuel 
Stamp) that makes biodiesel manufacturers and importers eligible for official credit at both reduced 
interest rates and on federal taxes. 
381
  GATT Article XXIV (5) states ‗… the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the 
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption 
of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free trade area…‘ GATT 
Article XXIV (5). 
382
For impacts on Regional Agreement on Agriculture, see also, Diao, X., Roe, T & Somwaru, A. (2001) 
‗what is the cause of Growth in regional Trade: Liberalisation or RTAs? The Case of Agriculture‘, 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford: Uk. See also: OECD, (2009) Agricultural policies in Emerging 
economies 2009: Monitoring and evaluation, Chapter 2: Brazil. 
383
 Members are: Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil. In Portuguese it is ‗Mercosul‘. 
384
MERCOSUR preferences rates on all products were to be extended to Bolivia and Chile by 2011 or 
2014. 
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other members of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI).385 In addition, 
Brazil signed bilateral trade agreements with Cuba (December 1999) and Mexico (July 
2002), and as a member of the MERCOSUR, it also signed economic cooperation 
agreements with Mexico (July 2002), the Andean Community (December 2003) and 
Peru (August 2003).386 
Second, Brazil in its capacity as a member of the MERCOSUR negotiated an 
Interregional Association Agreement with the European Union.  The agreement is aimed 
at liberalising trade with a view to establishing a free trade agreement most especially 
trade in agriculture.387 
Third, Brazil being one of the 34 Western Hemisphere members, signed the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) initiatives. Economically its participation in the FTAA is 
deemed to be more beneficial than the Free Trade Agreement with the European 
Union.388 The FTAA was appraised for its expansionary contributions (particularly in 
agricultural trade) on output and employment in most Latin American countries. This is 
buttressed by the overwhelming success of landless farmers in the Brazilian territory 
who could not make it in the 1950s because of government‘s protectionist practice 
under the ISI strategy. 
Fourth, Brazil under the MERCOSUR and the MTS has signed preferential trade 
agreements with certain African389 countries and unions such as the South African 
                                                             
385
 For details on Mercosur, see also, O‘keefe, T.A (1994) ‗An Analysis of the Mercosur Economic 
Integration Project from a legal Perspective: Recent Developments‘ Int’l Lawyer Vol. 28, available: 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/intlyr28&div=34&g_sent=1&collection=journals[31
st
 
March 2011]. 
386
OECD (2005), 119. 
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Customs Union (SACU),390 Mozambique, and the Economic and Monetary Union of 
West Africa (ECOWAS).391 This bilateral relationship acts as a link for donation 
(especially via the Africa-Brazil Cooperation Program-ABCP) and a contribution for 
investment strategies. Thus most African countries need to adopt and rely on this link by 
Brazil with genuine concern for it would serve as a lesson.392 It is worthy to note that 
Brazil as a member of the MERCOSUR is also a member of the BRICS.393 
Generally, these regional trend agreements have proven to develop a close relationship 
between intra-regional agricultural and trade liberalisation conducted by member 
countries in the WTO including Brazil and its signatories. Thus much is still to be told by 
member states about the successes of the proliferation of Regional trade agreements 
under the MTS. 
3.4-Conclusion 
 
From the outset (1950-60), Brazilian agricultural policy was too protectionist via the 
application of the ISI with bias in favour of agriculture over industry. As consequence to 
the crisis in the 1970s, agriculture underwent a new turn for liberalisation starting from 
the 1990s. Thus pursuant to Article 6.2 of the AoA, there was government intervention 
with the implementation of support measures.394 As a result, the GOB undertook drastic 
reduction moves on tariff protection and abolished all non-tariff barriers in an attempt to 
achieve its goal under the Uruguay Round and the MERCOSUR. Without fear of 
contradiction, the success of Brazil‘s agricultural trade underlies its policy reforms, tilted 
especially towards the agricultural support measures.395 This is possible by virtue of the 
fact that Brazil as a developing country takes opportunity under the SDT and injects 
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enough money (subsidies) in agricultural R&D for it is neither regarded as direct nor 
actionable subsidies. Brazil‘s active participation under multilateral, regional and 
bilateral trade agreements is ample evidence of its bargaining position particularly in 
agriculture. 
 
Further in Chapter four, this research will look at agricultural trade in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and in particular, the position of South Africa which is a leading country in Sub-
Saharan Africa.   
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CHAPTER 4 
AGRICULTURE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 
4.1- Background and Impediments to Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
As Brazil in the 1960s, Sub-Saharan Africa was a net-food exporter and grew 
considerably in the 1950s, more rapidly than Asia. However, in the 1980s, Sub-Saharan 
Africa became a net-food importer when prices of its key commodity exports tumbled 
and resulted in a slowdown in agricultural growth. For a better understanding of Sub-
Saharan Africa‘s slow growth in agriculture, an inference is drawn from two developing 
countries that experienced a similar oil boom in their predominant agricultural economy; 
Nigeria in Sub-Saharan Africa and Indonesia in Asia. It is evidenced that until 1970, 
Nigeria‘s economy outweighed that of Indonesia, but over the next quarter-century, the 
reverse was true for the Indonesian economy which is now at the forefront. Reason 
being that, the Indonesian economy experienced a marked diverged outcome despite 
the fact that both countries experienced a common oil boom in their predominant 
agricultural economy.396 Though the impediments of agricultural growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are not unique, principal findings have proven that African agriculture has been 
shackled by many and varied factors.397 
 
It is worth noting that the factors responsible for Sub-Saharan African slow pattern of 
agricultural growth and trade varies in regions as well as from country to country. For 
instance, in the 1970s, political instability in most Sub-Saharan African Countries has 
resulted in economic deterioration and uncertainty, thereby distracting stakeholders 
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from investing in agriculture. Moreover, the existence of poor public policies (on 
investment choices), coupled with insufficient infrastructural development weakened the 
legal framework and judicial system. Consequently, it corrupted the management of 
public resources, particularly those involved in the marketing of key crops and 
minerals.398 In addition, the limited openness to international trade (caused by high tax 
rates) coupled with the lack of social capital, prompted as low and undercapitalised 
agricultural sector leading to low per capita income. It is worth noting that, most Sub-
Saharan African Countries still practice a continued colonial pattern of trade in 
commodity exports. Furthermore, the landlocked geographic location (which contains 
about 40% of the Sub-Saharan African population)399 of certain poor Sub-Saharan 
African countries (Chad, Sudan, Central Africa), has made it difficult (natural barrier to 
trade) and most costly for agricultural imports. Finally, the lack of appropriate and 
established institutions with the capacity building in most Sub-Saharan African countries 
has also been a problem for slow economy growth.400 All these policies have impacted 
negatively on African agriculture thereby rendering it less competitive in the MTS.  
 
The Director-General of the WTO Lamy, called on Sub-Saharan African governments to 
regulate the continued rise in agricultural prices. Reason being that Africa‘s current food 
trade deficit was estimated at USD 20 billion and could become worst if not regulated.401 
Since 1980, Sub-Saharan Africa‘s aggregate per capita GDP has declined almost at a 
rate of 1% per annum, with almost 32 countries becoming poorer402 as a result of the 
world economic crisis in the 1980s. 
 
Although the constraints of agricultural growth and productivity faced by Sub-Saharan 
African countries are not unique, attempts were made at sub-regional levels as well as 
on country by country basis in order to identify the country specific constraints. For 
instance, in countries like Somalia, Mozambique, Chad, Sudan and Ethiopia, suitable 
strategic actions were attempts to reduce civil strife and provide disaster relief from 
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disasters which affect the countries. Furthermore, sound transparency principles ought 
to be established with the introduction of techniques to generate rapid increase in food 
production thereby providing farm inputs. Moreover, rural transports and agricultural 
policy ought to be improved. On the other hand, as regards the West and Central 
African zones, strategic actions on implementing sound macro-economic policies were 
deemed best in stimulating agricultural growth (especially in the CEMAC/franc zones). 
For instance, the best option strategy for a country like Zaire with abundant natural 
resources is: enhanced improvement in government management towards investment 
and infrastructural development. Whereas, a best-suited option strategy for better 
agricultural performing countries like Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania and Nigeria, would be 
to pursue continued improvement in their agricultural policy and technological 
transfer.403 
 
In conclusion, factors that influence slow agricultural growth in Sub-Saharan African 
countries vary from various regions as well as countries. These results from the lack of 
capacity building, regarded as a cornerstone to better implementation of most 
agricultural policies. Furthermore, this chapter will to an extent provide a brief rundown 
of the agricultural growth trend and it role in Sub-Saharan Africa. It will expound on 
agricultural trade policies in South Africa considered a major Sub-Saharan country, its 
commitments in the AoA and its participation under other trade agreements. 
4.2-The Evolution of Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Sub-Saharan African agriculture as that of Brazil underwent an evolution through 
various phases (during the post war-period) with similar experience. First, during the 
1960s, the agricultural economy was characterised by state intervention and control via 
the implementation of an import substitution strategy. For instance product markets and 
marketing boards were created characterised by taxation, price setting mechanisms and 
public trading monopolies initiated by most Sub-Saharan African governments. Second, 
the food production trends combined with imports, population growth and poverty 
experienced a phase (1960-1980 periods) of food deficit. For instance, during this 
period, aggregate food production in Sub-Saharan Africa grew very slowly at a rate of 
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1.8% per annum, a rate below the aggregate growth of Latin America as well as Asia.404 
Third, in the 1980s, Africa underwent an era of structural adjustment, characterised by 
gradual privatisation of state-owned farms, reduction of agricultural taxes and the 
dismantling of marketing boards for key commodities thereby reversing the import 
substitution strategy.405 
 
These moves were suddenly triggered by a rise in world real interest rates which 
resulted in a global recession, and later, in unfavourable terms of trade for Africa. 
Suddenly, Sub-Saharan Africa‘s interest to reform the public-sectors was instigated and 
sponsored by the Bretton Wood Institutions (World Bank and the IMF under the 
‗Structural Adjustment Plan‘) with loans under conditionality terms.406 Today most of 
these African countries are seeking for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative. However, this does not qualify as a panacea for agricultural 
productivity, food security and poverty alleviation as most Sub-Saharan governments 
are still adamant not to improve their domestic policies. Thus Africa's food deficit has 
persisted and most particular is that agricultural productivity in Africa is growing at a 
regressive rate. In the near future, current rise in food prices may lead to actual food 
insecurity especially among the least developed countries (net-food importers).407 
Therefore, in order for Sub-Saharan Africa to meet its food security needs in the next 
ten years, agricultural production should increase by 1% to 2% (per year) accompanied 
with an improvement in policy reforms.408 It is worth noting that, the mode of current 
agricultural investment pursued in Sub-Saharan Africa by least developed countries with 
foreign investors has proved the worst. For instance, countries like Sudan, Zambia, 
Angola and Mozambique are currently selling their land assets to rich countries like the 
Gulf States, China and South Korea. Consequently, these rich countries produce food 
and export them to feed their rich-country populations in order to safeguard against food 
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insecurity.409 Thus such a practice of wanton acquisition of farm/rural land by aliens 
coined as ‗Agricultural Investment‘ seems inhuman as it puts the lives of desperate 
African citizens at risk of food insecurity. As mentioned earlier in chapter three, in order 
to avoid such a mess, Brazil under the reign of President Lula (2010), revised and 
tightened the provision on land acquisition by aliens. Giving it a critical look, if continued 
with such an investment scheme, Africa will remain a loser, as it will not only suffer from 
the rising food prices, but would also face challenges to compete in agricultural trade 
under the MTS. Although Sub-Saharan Africa is noted for its comparative advantage in 
agriculture, if it does not pursue favourable investment strategies that suit its context, it 
may end up growing at the regressive progression. Ultimately all that matters is food 
sufficiency. 
  
4.3-The Role of Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Generally, it is worth noting that agriculture is the cornerstone of Africa‘s economy. 
Considering the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa has a comparative advantage in 
agriculture, it is therefore an integral part of development in most Sub-Saharan African. 
For instance, it constitutes a large share of national output and employs a majority of 
the labour force in most developing countries.410 According to a 2005 report by the 
World Bank Commission for Africa, agriculture is a critical sector for the Sub-Saharan 
African Region for it accounts for about 30% of the GDP and employs about 75% of the 
population.411 With regards to a 2008 World Development Report, the GDP growth of 
Agriculture for the poorest people in Sub-Saharan Africa is about four times more 
effective in raising their per capita income, than the GDP growth outside the agricultural 
sector.412 The role of Agriculture in this region is indispensable. For instance, Agriculture 
serves as a major employer, inter alia; it comprises a significant source of income, 
export and rural livelihood to the people, and contributes as a stimulant for other 
economic sectors in most Sub-Saharan African countries.  
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Despite the contribution of agriculture to Sub-Saharan Africa‘s overall economy growth, 
only little official development assistance is given to it. For instance, Sub-Saharan 
Africa‘s public expenditure for agriculture is only about 4% of governments‘ spending 
although the sector is still taxed at relatively high levels.413 As mentioned above, this 
accounts for Sub-Saharan Africa‘s minimal and continued decline of agricultural market 
share in world trade. Thus in the 53.4% contribution to Sub-Saharan Africa‘s total 
agricultural exports to world agricultural trade, only about five African countries are 
accountable: Cote d‘Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. Among agricultural 
exports from Africa, South Africa stands alone and accounted for 17.7% of the 
continent‘s total share in world agricultural export.  
 
In conclusion, agriculture is the backbone of most Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Despite the fact that the constraints on  agriculture are many and varied at Sub-regional 
and national levels, it is evidenced that the lack of agricultural growth and productivity; 
to an extent it is as a result of bad public policies pursued by most Sub-Saharan African 
governments at the multilateral level. Thus Sub-Saharan Africa‘s minimum market share 
of world agricultural exports is as a result of this practice. As mention earlier, just few 
Sub-Saharan African countries are accountable for the region‘s overall agricultural 
exports. 
4.4-South African Agriculture under the Multilateral Trading System 
4.4.1- Background to the South African Economy and Political evolution  
 
Under the first multi-racial elections in 1994 which marked an end to Apartheid, the 
Republic of South Africa ushered in majority rule under an ANC government, led by 
Nelson Mandela. Since then, South Africa has struggled to address the imbalances that 
existed during the Apartheid-era strategically by putting in place decent housing, 
education, and health care facilities for its citizens without discrimination.414 Recently 
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(January 2011), South Africa assumed a non-permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council for the term 2011-12.415 
 
South Africa is located at the southern tip of the continent of Africa.416 It has a total land 
area of 1,214,470 sq. km, ranked 25th in the world, an area slightly less than twice the 
size of Texas. It has a total population of 49,004,031 (July 2011 est.) and a growth rate 
of -0.38% (2011 est.), ranked 220th in the world.  South Africa has a GDP per capita 
income of $10,700 (2010 est.) with the agricultural sector accounting for 3% (2010 est.), 
and employing 9% of the labour force (2007 est.). South Africa's total land use pattern is 
comprised of a 12.1% of arable land,417 a 0.79% of permanent crops418 and lastly an 
87.11% of other crops419 (2005 est.).420 
 
Just as Brazil in Latin America, South Africa is considered the economic powerhouse 
and a gateway to other Sub-Saharan African countries. South Africa leads and 
contributes to the continent in industrial output and mineral production. Thus it 
generates a large proportion of Africa's electricity. As an emerging market, it possesses 
an abundant supply of natural resources; well-developed financial, legal, energy, 
communication and sophisticated transport sectors; and a stock exchange market, 
ranked among the top 18th in the world. Throughout the Southern African region and 
especially in the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), South Africa has a modern 
infrastructure which supports efficient distribution of goods under the MTS. It is worthy 
to note that, from 2004 to 2007 South Africa had a robust economic growth due to the 
benefits of macroeconomic stability and a global commodities boom. However, from 
2007 due to electricity crisis, South Africa experienced a fall in its GDP to nearly 2% in 
2009. Consequently, it resulted in a high unemployment rate with an out-dated 
infrastructure which constrained agricultural growth. For instance, South Africa 
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experiences a current balance of payment (BOP) deficit of -$16.51 billion (2010 est.) 
with a rising external debt of $80.52 billion (30 June 2010 est.).421 Despite the fact that 
South Africa has a booming economy, it is worth noting that, the majority of its GDP is 
composed of the industrial (31.2%) and services sectors (65.8%) (2010 est.), with the 
least acquired from the agricultural sector (3%, 2010 est.). Nevertheless, the problem of 
food security and agricultural trade still remains an issue for South Africa and Sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole under the MTS. 
 
4.4.2-Review of Agriculture in the South African Economy 
 
South Africa has a diversified economy, with its services and manufacturing sectors 
accounting for 65.8% and 31.2% of GDP respectively. In 1995, agriculture declined from 
3.9% to 2.8% in 2008 and later increased to 3% in 2010.422 Despite its minor 
contribution to GDP (3% in 2010 est.), the sector still remains important as it employs a 
large proportion of the unskilled workforce. Though Agriculture in South Africa is capital 
intensive and commercial, it is mostly in the hands of very few people.423 Nevertheless, 
primary agriculture has played an important role. As a result, it contributes to linkages in 
the up and down stream industries, created employment opportunities, and has also 
stimulated participation in foreign trade under the MTS and inter-regional linkages under 
regional agreements.424 Nevertheless, the greatest problem remains that of agricultural 
productivity and supply.  
 
Prior to the 1990s (during 1960s-1970s), South Africa‘s trade policy was characterised 
by high tariffs accompanied with extensive import controls.425 It was aimed at promoting 
export at the expense of import liberalisation, solely for reasons of domestic protection. 
However, in 1985 with the financial sanctions imposed on South Africa and the debt 
crises suffered with a BOP deficit (in the early 1990s), trade liberalisation was pursued 
as a panacea for macroeconomic growth and stabilisation. As a result, South Africa 
adopted two strategies. First, it adopted the Multilateral Trade Liberalisation System 
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under the Uruguay Round (1985) which began effectively in 1 January, 1995. Second, it 
adopted the Unilateral Trade Liberalisation System, whose schedule later expired in 
1999.426 
 
According to a 2005 OECD review of agricultural policy, the economies of South Africa 
and Brazil have undergone radical reforms over the past 10-15 years. These reforms 
are regarded as a contributing factor to a stable macroeconomic and investment climate 
stimulating agricultural growth in South Africa. Although the contribution of agriculture to 
South Africa‘s GDP is relatively small (3%), agriculture has contributed as well as 
benefited from these reforms; inter alia, achieving poverty reduction, sustainable 
economic development and poverty alleviation.427 It is worth noting that, agricultural 
growth in South Africa is mostly influenced by farm exports products, making South 
Africa a net-food exporting country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although livestock is an 
essential category of agricultural production in the economy of South Africa, South 
Africa remains a net-food importer of meat (livestock) originating mostly from Botswana 
and Namibia.428 Although the commercial farming sector is relatively well developed, 
most of the people in rural areas survive on subsistence agriculture although a larger 
number still suffers from lack of agricultural resource equipment and information on 
recent technologies.429 
 
South Africa has a variety of food categories. Most important for exports are sugar 
cane, maize and wheat. Traditionally, South Africa has also been a net-exporter of 
maize and sugar whereas it is a net-importer of wheat. In line with horticultural 
production, it consists of all the major fruit groups, such as, deciduous, citrus, and 
subtropical, vegetables and flowers.  As regards fruits produced and exported, there are 
citrus (61%), oranges, apples (44%), pears, peaches, table grapes (61%), and 
avocados.430 However, the importance of agriculture and trade in the overall economy 
declined since 2003. Furthermore, state intervention in agricultural markets declined 
when agricultural imports were subjected to a complex tariff structure while export 
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products benefited from higher average protection.431 This practice resulted in a decline 
in agriculture in the overall economy. This is a common practice with most Sub-Saharan 
African countries which limits the chances of international trade and therefore calls for 
change. 
 
4.4.3-Institutions and Policies complementing the South African Agricultural 
Sector 
 
South Africa has a limited potential in agriculture due to the numerous and varied 
constraints faced: poor land quality, scarcity of water,432 and high variable climatic 
conditions.433 Consequently, the government embarked on reform policies particularly 
on land and several other programmes which aimed at redressing problems faced by 
small farmers (especially the black farmers) and supporting disadvantaged farming 
communities. Most of these reforms were developed within the framework of the 
Agricultural Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (AgriBEE). It is worth noting 
that, in 2007, a draft Charter was finalised and approved by the Minister in Charge of 
Agriculture.434 This framework was the output of the Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act,435 launched in 2008. The creation of the AgriBEE was an initial effort 
by the government after numerous consultations with stakeholders, in recognition of the 
role of commercial farmers. It is aimed at enhancing productivity and empowerment of 
small holder farmers as well as promoting the participation in and equitable access of 
the black people to the agricultural sector. Another major fundamental issue in South 
African agricultural policy is the issue of land reform.436 Despite South Africa‘s 
comparative advantage in agriculture and the large endowments of precious stones and 
metals, the importance of agriculture has declined relatively. Thus this lack of ability to 
compete in world agricultural trade is as a result of low interest in agricultural 
investment.  
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4.4.3.1- Institutions complementing the South African Agricultural Sector 
 
As far as agricultural sectorial policies are concerned, six main institutions are 
responsible for formulating, implementing and regulating agricultural sectorial policies. 
They are: The Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs (currently separated into the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, and Department of Rural Development 
and Land Reform); the Department of Water Affairs-DWA (formerly the Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry); Department of Environmental Affairs-DEA (former 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism); Department of Trade and Industry- 
DTI. Besides, there exist other institutions, such as, the Agricultural Research Council 
(ARC); National Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC); supported with two financial 
institutions, such as, Land and Agricultural Bank (Land Bank) and the Development 
Bank of South Africa (DBSA).437 All these institutions have gone a long way in 
promoting agricultural growth and productivity; in particular the main policy objectives 
outlined in the White Paper on Agriculture (1995).438 This was later restated in the 
Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture (2001) and more recently in the Annual 
Strategic plans of the Department of Agriculture. 
 
4.4.3.2-Policies complementing to South African Agricultural Sector 
 
The main objective of the South African agricultural trade policy reform was to promote 
the integration of the sector into the global economy as a means to encourage greater 
competition and access to markets, technology and capital.439 In an attempt to achieve 
the policy objectives outlined in the White Paper on Agriculture, the government of 
South Africa established regulations (Acts) to be formulated and implemented. The 
main objective is to create an efficient and internationally competitive sector (which 
contributes to the objectives of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution-GEAR 
Strategy), increasing economic growth by reducing income inequality and eliminating 
poverty. Other agricultural policy objectives include the emergence of small and 
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medium-sized farms, food security, food safety, and environmental protection.440 These 
policies (strategies) are intended to stimulate and increase effective private sector 
participation in the agricultural production sector; address past injustices regarding land 
redistribution, agricultural support programmes (especially with disadvantaged 
subsistence farming communities), and implementing a programme of economic 
empowerment of the black population.441 
 
The South African agricultural sector is regulated by a number of laws and regulations 
(37 pieces of legislations out of which five are pending) such as the Animals Protection 
Act 1962,442 Veterinary and Para-Veterinary Professions Act 1982,443 Animal Diseases 
Act 1984,444 Meat Safety Act 2000,445 Animal Identification Act 2002,446 Animal Health 
Act 2002,447Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1993,448 Liquor 
Products Act 1989,449Agricultural Product Standard Act 1990,450 Conservation of 
Agricultural Resources Act 1983,451 Fencing Act 1963,452 Subdivision of Agricultural 
Land Act 1970,453 Plant Breeders' Rights Act 1976,454 Plant Improvement Act 1973,455 
Perishable Products Export Control 1983,456 Onderstepoort Biological Products 
Incorporation Act 1999,457 Genetically Modified Organisms Act 1997,458 Agricultural 
Produce Agents Act 1992,459 Marketing of Agricultural Products Act 1996,460 Agricultural 
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Research Act 1990,461 Agricultural Pests Act 1983,462 Animal Improvement Act 1988,463 
Fertilizer, Farm Feeds, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act 1947,464 
Agricultural Laws Extension Act 1996,465 Agricultural Laws Nationalisation Act 1998,466 
Root Constantia Trust Act 1993,467 Kwa-Zulu Cane Growers Association Act: Repeal 
Act 2002,468 Marine Living Resources Act 1998,469 National Forest Act 1998,470 National 
Veld and Forest Fire Act 1998,471 Sea Fishery Act 1988.472 Whereas the pending 
Legislations include the following: Plant Breeders' Rights Amendment Bill, Pound Bill, 
Fertilizer and Feeds Bill, Marine Fisheries Bill and the National Bill for Agricultural 
Training Institutes of South Africa.473 
 
Considering the above mentioned applicable legislation, it buttresses South Africa‘s 
sophisticated legal framework in Agriculture. Therefore it demonstrates an insight of 
South Africa‘s efforts in Agricultural reform. Nevertheless, this research will expound 
briefly on the important policy reforms. 
4.4.3.2.1-Trade Policy 
 
This policy category involves effort by South Africa to pursue trade liberalisation and 
integration into the global economy as an attempt to increase international competition. 
It is regarded as a way to promote economic efficiency and to promote welfare 
benefits.474 Thus trade liberalisation is regarded not as a panacea per se to poverty 
reduction. Therefore, it cannot be achieved by relying on the outcome of a single policy 
as it also depends on existing conditions as well as consideration of the production 
structure and options to rely on in the various countries.475 
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4.4.3.2.2-Institutional Policy 
 
Unlike the1980s (period of Apartheid) when South Africa had just three Agricultural 
Departments (Department of Agricultural Technical Services, Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Marketing, and Department of Agricultural Credit and Land tenure ), of 
recent, it is served by 14 Agricultural Departments each with individual agricultural 
policies. The institutions complementing South Africa‘s agricultural policy consist of the  
Agricultural Research Council (ARC), the National Agricultural Marketing Council 
(NAMC), and two financial institutions such as the Land and Agricultural Bank (Land 
Bank) and the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA). 
 
4.4.3.2.3-Fiscal Policy 
 
This policy Category consists mainly of the budgetary and tax policies on concessions. 
It is implemented in order to enhance fiscal efficiency, reduce inflation (through fiscal 
discipline) and budgetary deficit. It is worth noting that the tax concessions to South 
African farmers resulted in the depreciation of assets for over three years at rates of 
50%, 30% and 20% (per annum) respectively.476 
4.4.3.2.4-Land Development Policy477 
 
Under the South African Agricultural policy, Land reform is considered a fundamental 
element for agricultural growth.478 For instance, one of the most important land reforms 
which began in 1994 was the implementation of the Land and Assistance Act (as 
amended, Act No. 126 of 1993). It addresses three main elements (schemes): the 
restitution of unjustly distributed land acquired from indigenous people (especially the 
black farmers who suffered the consequences), land redistribution and land tenure 
reform. All these schemes are basically aimed to foster reconciliation and stability, 
promote economic growth, improve household welfare and alleviate poverty in rural 
areas.479 
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OECD reviews that, land redistribution is a main driver to accomplish the political 
objective to transfer 30% of white-owned agricultural land (around 25 million hectares) 
by 2014.480 In order to achieve this policy objective, much budget is needed under the 
‗Willing Buyer and Willing Seller‘ scheme which enables the buying and redistributing of 
White-owned lands. As a result, various programmes were instituted as follows: The 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) implemented in 2004/ 2005 
aimed at providing an on and off farm infrastructure; and the Micro-agricultural Financial 
Scheme of South Africa (MAFISA) aimed at providing financial access to farmers, 
administered by the Land Bank on behalf of the National Department of Agriculture.  
 
Furthermore, the OECD reviewed that, in an attempt to accelerate the pace of land 
redistribution from 2006/2007, three strategies were implemented: First, the land and 
Agrarian Reform Project (LARP) (2006/2007) was structured within the framework of 
delivery and collaboration on Land reform and agricultural support services (‗One Stop 
Shop‘ service centres). Second, the Pro-Active land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS), as a 
new instrument was created to accelerate land delivery. Third, this strategy dwells on 
the Sourcing of Strategic Partners, such as key non-governmental stakeholders, with 
the aim to speed up land delivery and more importantly, ensure stability of the farm 
projects. 
 
Generally, Land reform policy is the main underlying issue in the South African 
agricultural policy. It is at the top priority in order to solve the injustices that existed 
during the Apartheid era. 
4.4.3.2.5- Agricultural Marketing and Pricing Policy 
 
With respect to the orientation on agriculture and agro-food industries, the principal 
legislation, the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act,481 was implemented. In order to 
reduce state intervention, it was aimed at improving market access, market efficiency of 
agricultural products, export earnings and the viability of South Africa‘s agricultural 
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sector.482 By virtue of this Act, marketing funds were transferred to the National 
Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC).483 Though state intervention  was limited by this 
Act, the state established guidelines for prices on certain products such as grape fruits 
(also for grape juice; drinking wine, distilled wines, wine spirit, and export wines); milk 
and other dairy products; and cotton lint. This Act implemented five main schemes: 
Single-Channel Fixed Price Schemes, Single Channel Pool Schemes, Surplus Removal 
Schemes, Supervisory and Price Regulatory Schemes and Promotion Scheme. 
 
4.4.4-South Africa in Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Agreements on Agriculture484 
 
South Africa, the gateway and powerhouse of Africa is a strong proponent of 
multilateralism. It considers multilateralism as a strategy to achieve globalisation and 
the opportunities of interdependence in the national economies.485 Historically, South 
Africa‘s membership of the GATT/WTO (1995) has played an active role in the ongoing 
Doha Development Agenda negotiations. This resulted in the various configurations 
under AoA and NAMA, which are deemed interesting in the ongoing negotiations. For 
instance, South Africa is an active member of seven WTO negotiation groups.486 These 
groups include: African Pacific Group (ACP),487 African group,488 G-90,489 Cairns 
group,490 G-20,491 NAMA-11,492 ‗W52‘ sponsors493 and the Joint proposal.494 South 
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Africa considers the Doha negotiations to be at a position to offer members of the WTO 
an opportunity to strengthen the rules-based trading system. This barely reduces the 
imbalances/inequities and supports development-related issues not yet regarded as an 
integral part of any previous multilateral trade negotiation under the GATT/WTO.495 
Furthermore, South Africa as any other WTO member considers bilateral trade 
agreements as a complement to the MTS. It is worth noting that, the proliferation of 
Trade Agreements is a contentious issue in the WTO. 
4.4.4.1-South Africa’s commitments to and implementation of the AoA 
(a)-Import Measures: 
 
During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, South Africa was self-
designated as a developed country, and undertook similar agricultural commitments like 
developed country members. Thus since 1994, South Africa has undergone 
considerable tariff reform compared to other members. Currently, South Africa‘s binding 
rate is 96.5% and its simple average final bound rate on agricultural products is at 
ceiling rates averaging 39.5%. Notably, South Africa‘s simple average MFN applied rate 
is deemed to have declined from 15% in 1997 to 8.9% in 2009.496 Consequently, the 
simplification of South Africa‘s tariff regime, has led to a remarkable improvement of 
trade liberalisation. As regards non ad valorem (NAV) duties, South Africa has not fully 
protected agriculture from global distortions. Despite South Africa‘s simple lower tariff 
(8.9%), when compared with other upper middle income countries it is considered 
having a high WTO bind coverage (96.5%). It is worth noting that, as a member of 
SACU, South Africa applies a common external tariff to non- member states as well as 
ad valorem tariffs and specific duties on import protection on agriculture and agro-food 
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products. SACU for instance, has a preference price agreement for certain agricultural 
products with the EU.497 
 
According to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), South Africa‘s too many duty 
free lines (considered as the higher number) have resulted in a greater rate of tariff 
dispersion.498 These bindings provided the country with substantial degree of freedom 
without necessarily violating its WTO obligations. This contributed in making South 
Africa‘s economy moderately protected by tariffs. For instance, South Africa applies 
strict SPS requirements on agricultural products. This practice is regarded as a major 
barrier to trade as most agricultural goods are subjected to strict quality standards 
and/or technical regulations. Furthermore, there is continued maintenance on import 
prohibitions and control measures on certain products (such as live plants and animals) 
which are subjected to the above control measures. 
 
In addition, South Africa adopts and applies tariff rate quotas (TRQs) that cover a large 
range of agricultural products (such as, animal products, potatoes, vegetables, fruits, 
cereals, coffee, tea, oil seeds, sugar, food preparations, wine and spirits, vinegar, 
tobacco, and cotton) which are not binding.499  It is worth noting that the initial TRQs for 
certain products (such as, sheep meat/mutton, fresh milk and cream, cheese, eggs, 
certain cereals crops, potatoes, and sugar) were expected to increase.500However, the 
MFN tariffs on most of the significant lines appeared to be at below the blanket rate 
(20%) scheduled as the maximum rate for TRQs in the AoA.  
 
Moreover, South Africa levies a standard rate VAT of 14% on all domestically produced 
and imported agricultural goods whereas certain basic foodstuffs such as brown bread, 
maize meal, eggs, milk, fruit, and vegetables (including their exports) are zero-rated. 
However, specific levies are applied on certain agricultural products. They are collected 
especially at the first point of sale by the various agricultural associations concerned.501 
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Furthermore, imports and domestically produced dairy products, potatoes, red meat, 
and sorghum are levied at the same rate, except exports of bulk wine.502 
 
(b)-Export Measures 
 
Since the abolition of the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS) in July 1997, South 
Africa‘s exports have become zero-rated considering the fact that no subsidies were 
applied for agro-food products. However, the South African Sugar Association still 
subsidises sugar, with the costs borne by local consumers. Furthermore, in order to 
ensure a smooth and active participation of small and medium enterprises and 
disadvantaged communities exporting under certain quota conditions (such as with the 
US and EU), South Africa introduced an export permit system.503 
 
4.4.4.2-South Africa’s commitments in Bilateral Agreements 
(a)-South Africa-Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
 
South Africa is a founding member of SACU created on 11 December 1969 with the 
signature of member states (South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland). 
SACU entered into force on the 1st of March 1970, thereby replacing the Customs Union 
Agreement of 1910. It is considered the oldest existing customs union in the World with 
a common external applied tariff on movement of goods to non-member states whereas 
with member states, it applies duty free and quota free.504 Under SACU, import and 
export restrictions were encouraged in an attempt to protect infant industries thereby 
encouraging the BLNS countries to improve their economies. By virtue of Article 31 of 
the SACU agreement, member states were obliged to seek the consent for newly 
signed trade agreements with third parties before they were enforced. On the other 
hand, existing bilateral trade agreements entered into by member states prior to 2002 
were to remain in force upon approval unanimous approval from all member states.505 
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Whatever the case, the provision is duly respected regarding the diverse views by 
BLNS members as regards EU-Economic and Partnership Agreement (EPA) and South 
Africa who refused the EU-EPA deal.506 
 
(b)-South Africa-Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
 
During a new era (1994), South Africa became a member of SADC under a Free Trade 
Agreement implemented between 2000 and 2012 among SADC member states.507 For 
instance, the Department of Foreign Affairs at the Directorate of SADC National Contact 
Point is charged with the duty to monitor and manage South Africa's role in the process 
of regional integration. The relevant programmes and activities of SADC member states 
are directed to the actual Departments. For instance, the Department of Agriculture is in 
charge of agricultural negotiations.508 
(c)-SADC-EC EPA Negotiations 
 
South Africa as a member of the SADC is involved in the SADC-EC EPA negotiations. 
Basically, this negotiation is aimed at replacing the non-reciprocal trading preferences 
that ACP countries received from the EU under the Lome Agreement. It is worth noting 
that, the negotiation is compatible with WTO FTAs rules.509 It is worth noting that South 
Africa had committed to a South Africa-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation 
Agreement (TDCA).510 Regarding the conclusion of the EU-EPA negotiation, South 
Africa has not yet decided unless the EU agrees not to introduce new issues for 
negotiation.511 
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(d)-SACU-MERCOSUR 
 
As a member of SACU, South Africa is also involved in the SACU512- MERCOSUR513 
Preferential Trade Agreement. It was signed in December 2004 as a step towards a 
Free Trade Area. The issues decided included the principle of SDT for small and lesser-
developed economies of the parties. The agreement also covered (narrowly) 
Agricultural and industrial goods. By virtue of Annexes 1 and 2, both parties setup 
respective tariff concessions covering about 1000 products (each with a preference 
margin) spread over 100-10% whereas the other Annexes covered the General Rules of 
Origin, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement.514 The final round of Negotiations between 
SACU and MERCOSUR was held on the 17– 8 April 2008 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 
and it eventually replaced the agreement signed (December 2004) in Belo Horizonte, 
Brazil. 
 
(e)-SACU-European Free Trade Association (EFTA) FTA Negotiations 
 
South Africa as a member of the SACU also concluded FTA negotiations on several 
agreements with the European Free Trade Association EFTA (in Pretoria- South Africa 
from 24-26 August 2005). It includes two FTAs with three separate bilateral agricultural 
agreements between SACU and Norway, Iceland and Switzerland/Liechtenstein 
respectively.515 These four agreements have formed an instrument of an FTA between 
SACU and EFTA. 
(f)-SACU-United States of America (USA) Trade, Investment and Development Co-
operation Agreement (TIDCA) 
 
South Africa as a member of SACU (16 April 2008), signed an agreement on TIDCA 
with the USA. Initially, this agreement was initiated in 2001 between SACU and USA, 
known as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). It was aimed at concluding an 
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FTA on duty-free and quota-free market access opportunities.516 Though 
comprehensive negotiations with the USA began in 2003, because of diverse views on 
a number of issues (2004), member states suspended the TIDCA. It is aimed at 
promoting and expanding investment, and to diversify trade between SACU and the 
USA. It also establishes a Consultative Group on Trade and Investment.517 
 
Generally, South Africa‘s bilateral trade agreements have proven to be wide and open 
ended. It also joined Brazil in the BRICS518 as well as its being involved in a bilateral 
trade agreement with India. This is as a result of the proliferation of Regional and 
Bilateral Trade Agreements alleged to exist in a Corp Web theory in the multilateral 
trade world.  
 
4.4.4.3-Conclusion 
 
Generally, economic development in most Sub-Saharan African countries is linked to 
the indispensability of agricultural growth and sustainability especially of export 
products. This is evidenced as agriculture employs and absorbs a majority of the 
unskilled labour force as well as contributes significantly to Africa‘s total market share of 
exports to world trade and GDP (per capita). It also serves as a means of subsistence 
to the majority of the African poor population. Despite agricultures importance, most 
African countries hesitate to comply fully with the rules of trade liberalisation both at the 
multilateral and regional levels. Thus although most developed countries tend to 
maintain high agricultural tariffs and provide greater agricultural subsidies, the low level 
of agricultural productivity and the lack of export diversification in most parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa is the result of bad public policies and practices mentioned earlier. 
 
In the case of South Africa, though agriculture is of greater importance to the economy, 
its contribution to GDP is minimal (3%) unlike the industrial and services sectors. This 
                                                             
516
For details, see DAFF, AGOA and Sub-Saharan Africa. Available: 
http://www.daff.gov.za/doaDev/sideMenu/internationalTrade/docs/AGOA_AfricanGrowthOpportunityAct.p
df [20th April 2011]. 
517
 For details on SACU-USA TIDCA, see the Act. Available: http://www.sacu.int/docs/tidca/agreement.pdf 
[20th April 2011]. 
518
For details, see Latest News on South African Focus. Available: 
http://www.southafricafocus.com/2011/04/20/south-africa-joins-brazil-in-the-brics-it-decisions/ [20
th
 April 
2011]. 
 
 
 
 
103 
 
buttresses the fact that, the government does not develop much interest in the 
agricultural sector resulting in lack of adequate investment on R&D compared to the 
case of Brazil. Though South Africa expresses its interest in agriculture in bilateral trade 
agreements, it continues to suffer the problem of agricultural productivity as it tries to 
meet up with food supply and sufficiency. Consequently, South Africa, implements the 
land reform policy although it is not adequate to serve as the only panacea. Despite the 
fact that, South Africa reduced its agricultural tariff barriers, its tariff structure is still 
considered as one of the most complex and highest in the world (with an average duty 
rate as high as New Zealand‘s). However, way back in December 1993, South Africa 
solicited for a developing country status from the GATT.519 Nevertheless, South Africa‘s 
efforts to overcome trade constraints, is proven by its active involvements in a series of 
bilateral trade agreements. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1-CONCLUSION 
 
As a widely accepted notion, Sub-Saharan Africa‘s comparative advantage in 
agriculture was previously an issue that need not be questioned due to its favourable 
conditions (good climate, available cheap labour and natural resources). However, the 
fallacy of such statement became a concern as Sub-Saharan Africa moved from being a 
net-food exporter in the 1960s to a net-food importer in the 1980s. It is evidenced that 
Sub-Saharan Africa‘s comparative advantage in agriculture is not effectively put into 
use. Therefore one can say that Sub-Saharan Africa‘s slow agricultural growth is 
attributed mostly to the lack of proper and adequate agricultural investment policy 
especially in the area of R&D. Moreover, the slow progress in regional integration, 
inadequate training of agricultural specialists, bad governance and poor institutional 
framework policies are also responsible for these shortcomings. Finally, due 
consideration is taken of the existence of conflicts and the lack of ability to connect and 
expand small farm holders to international markets. 
Upon accession of newly independent developing countries into the GATT/WTO 
(1950s), the idea of SDT was conceptualised in the MTS, to provide wider ranges of 
flexibilities and preferences to these developing countries. It was introduced for reasons 
of economic weakness/differences that exist between developing countries and their 
developed counterparts. Among these flexibilities, various exceptions and deviations 
were introduced under the rule based MTS. These flexibilities broadened the scope of 
SDT. However, today developing and least developed countries still request for much 
extension which is deemed not necessarily the only panacea for easy integration into 
the MTS. 
At the beginning of the GATT, export competition in agriculture was given special 
treatment. This however became a leeway for the protection of the agricultural sector by 
most countries. For instance, while quantitative restrictions were allowed for agricultural 
products, they were prohibited for non-agricultural products. This practice was aimed at 
safeguarding national food security and to encourage agricultural home industries. 
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Nevertheless, GATT finally brought agriculture into negotiation under the AoA as well as 
incorporated SDT provisions with the aim to facilitate developing countries integration 
into the MTS. As mentioned earlier in chapter two, the concept of SDT and the AoA are 
closely linked considering the fact that most of the agricultural preferences given to 
developing countries under the MTS are contained in both concepts.  
However, it is worth noting that since the conceptualisation of SDT, only countries like 
Brazil, Chile, China, India, and South Korea have benefited most due to tangible 
development in their economy whereas Sub-Saharan African countries remain stagnant 
experiencing a decline in their market share of agricultural world trade. This scenario is 
therefore questioned: Why such a decline in Sub-Saharan Africa‘s agricultural exports? 
Why have Brazil and the other countries benefited from SDT and not Sub-Saharan 
Africa? This research paper argued that though Sub-Saharan Africa needs SDT, SDT is 
not actually the only panacea in the MTS. Therefore there exist alternative strategies 
(basically on domestic policies) which if pursued Sub-Saharan Africa will meet up with 
standards. Thus the case of Brazil expresses an illuminating lesson for Sub-Saharan 
Africa. For instance, the GOB, basing on the provisions of Article 6.2 of the AoA, 
invested massively in agricultural R&D and further strengthened its institutional and 
pricing policies. Therefore, if adopted and relied upon, Sub-Saharan Africa would be 
able to crack such a hard nut as Brazil did. 
It is worth noting that the reasons accounting for Sub-Saharan Africa‘s negative 
agricultural growth and development are not unique. Thus they vary both at regional 
and national levels. They face complex technical, economic, social, and political 
challenges. First, Sub-Saharan Africa lacks adequate agricultural investment and 
infrastructural development. Second, there is decline in the technical skills to support 
agricultural development. Third, the landlocked geographic location520 prevents a 
majority of small agricultural countries in Sub-Sahara Africa (like Malawi) from 
economies of scale in research, training and policy design. These countries face huge 
transport costs for agricultural inputs (such as fertilizer) and export products (at an 
average of 50%) higher than in a typical coastal country.521 Fourth, most Sub-Saharan 
agricultural institutions are not well structured due to corruption. Fifth, most Sub-
                                                             
520
Most of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa lives in landlocked countries. 
521
World Bank, (2008) World Development Report 2008: agriculture for development, 232. 
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Saharan countries lack capacity building. Sixth, the existence of political instability as a 
consequence of a power struggle is the top priority of most governments. Finally, Sub-
Saharan Africa lack adequate regional integration blocks and worst still, most of the 
countries continue to rely on the old colonial pattern of commodity exports. 
Despite South Africa‘s position as the powerhouse and gateway of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(flexible nature of investment in the economy), its contribution of agriculture to its GDP 
is merely 3% compared to the services (31.2%) and industrial (65.8%). However, in an 
attempt to redress the problem of slow agricultural growth, South Africa through its 
agricultural policy, laid much emphasis on reforming land and price regulations. 
Furthermore, as a member of SADC and SACU, South Africa also maintains a common 
external tariff to non-members and a duty-free and quota-free access to member states 
of SACU. 
 
5.2- Recommendations 
 
According to the findings and conclusion to the above mentioned constraints faced by 
Sub-Saharan African countries in agricultural growth and development, the following 
recommendations are as follows (to meet up with future global trade in agricultural 
products in the MTS): 
Foremost, Sub-Saharan Africa should pursue and increase its capacity to pursue 
agricultural investment, especially in research and infrastructural development (most 
especially in rural areas). Forinstance, when Brazil, attempted to integrate into global 
agricultural trade, the GOB invested heavily into sustainable research and development 
which has today made Brazil a powerhouse in the global economy. Therefore Sub-
Saharan African countries (especially the least developed) should cease from selling 
their farm/rural lands to the rich countries (the Gulf, Japan and Korea) as a means to 
attract agricultural investment. These rich countries produce and export these 
agricultural products to their rich countries population for reasons of food security 
thereby leaving Africa in absolute food crisis.  
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Moreover, African countries should also challenge the bias in agricultural commodity 
trade by switching from the old colonial system of commodity exports trade to modern 
agricultural manufactured exports. This is achieved via bridging both agricultural and 
industrial sectors in order to expand export, based on converting primary agricultural 
commodities into processed and semi-processed agricultural products. It can be 
realised if there is mass improvement and transfer of technical know-how in agricultural 
technology from the developed (rich) to poor Sub-Saharan African nations rather than 
monetary assistance. Thus in order to make it effective there must be adequate 
government intervention (incentives and implementation) via policies that favour 
agricultural development. For instance, with Brazil‘s diversified agriculture and 
modernised technology on large scale agricultural farming, it is able to produce ethanol 
from sugar and on a large scale. It is of utmost importance that Sub-Saharan African 
countries should ensure a suitable domestic policy on agricultural productivity and 
sustainable growth rather than relying on the long awaited SDT extension which has 
proven to be inadequate. 
In addition, considering the fact that Sub-Saharan African countries have a comparative 
advantage in agriculture, governments (either as regional blocks or at national levels) 
should design and tailor proper agricultural reform programmes that suit their goal. This 
will help achieve food security and meaningful international trade goals in agricultural 
products. Just as Brazil, Sub-Saharan governments should incorporate and create more 
research institutions, agricultural universities (educating and training of researchers, 
farmers and extension workers) and most importantly, improve on capacity building at 
all levels (human and administrative).  
Furthermore, Sub-Saharan Africa should pursue the right and effective strategy of 
regional integration (strong regional blocks) and oppose the adoption of stringent control 
measures by individual member states which would only exist to damage the objectives 
of regional integration. Sub-Saharan Africa should also develop a strong bargaining 
position eliminating tariff peaks and tariff escalation on processed and semi-processed 
agricultural products. This would greatly discourage the amount of exports on value-
added and high priced agricultural commodities. Through this, Sub-Saharan African 
countries should make reciprocal concessions with their developed counterparts 
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reducing their high bound agricultural tariffs, in exchange for better market access for 
their agricultural commodities into major export markets like the EU. In order to 
succeed, Sub-Saharan Africa should produce specifically products that could compete 
with the EU‘s sensitive and special products (in order to penetrate the markets). 
However, just as Brazil, Sub-Saharan African governments should develop a political 
willingness that could encourage agricultural trade, promote the creation of smallholder 
farmer Associations, as well as Cooperatives and other Business Associations. This 
would enable rural farmers to raise capital (via loans) from these cooperatives in order 
to purchase agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and machine. A typical example is the 
case of a small country like Malawi as the government assists farmers to purchase 
fertilizers. Thus for reasons of economies of scale, it would be better for landlocked 
small countries to integrate as a block and purchase farm inputs on a large scale in 
order to avoid high transportation costs. These governments should also develop 
strategies to attract stakeholders such as providing reasonable agricultural tax 
concessions. With this, Sub-Saharan African agriculture would improve due to the 
increased participation of stakeholders thus boosting the market share in global 
agricultural trade. 
Finally, the governments of Sub-Saharan African should develop a proponent view for 
agricultural trade negotiations as well as encourage mass investment in agricultural 
research. This will serve as a cornerstone to economic development. Overall, it is 
evidenced and worthy to note that the key to agricultural growth and development is in 
the hands of governments. 
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